To Kampuchea and Beyond →


ean McMeekin is a historian perhaps best known for his revisionist accounts of the Russian Revolution and World War II. He’s not afraid of a challenge. Nevertheless, while his thought-provoking new book, To Overthrow the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism, is well worth reading, it does not quite deliver — presumably, in part, for reasons of space — on the immense promise implicit in its subtitle. Moreover, the second “rise” of communism (if that’s what it is) turns out to be far from its second coming, which would otherwise be a not inappropriate phrase to use. Even in the secular form it has taken since Karl Marx’s time, communism is a religion in all but name, and one with obvious millenarian overtones…

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Imagining the Chairman

Art and China's Revolution

National Review, November 3, 2008

Park Avenue, New York City, September 2008  © Andrew Stuttaford

Park Avenue, New York City, September 2008  © Andrew Stuttaford

The sculpture (by Sui Jianguo) squats, a weird piece of a whole that was never made, on a median bisecting one of the more affluent slices of Manhattan’s Park Avenue. It’s of a distinctive, very distinctive, jacket, nothing more, but it’s oddly bulky, as if the colossus who once wore it were, impossibly, somewhere within. And because the shape and the cut of that jacket are so distinctive, the onlooker is encouraged to fill it with his own image of the only individual (out of hundreds of millions once clothed in such garments) it could possibly represent.

He’s a man (“monster” is too easy an alibi for you and for me) whose deeds heaped further disgrace on an already savage century, yet who now finds himself with a place in the collective imagination that is strangely, and disquietingly, ambivalent. If, on the other hand, you’re just puzzled by the sight of an oversized piece of metal tailoring in the middle of Park Avenue, glance across at the building that houses the Asia Society. A banner emblazoned with Chairman Mao — ah, that’s whose jacket it is — flutters, advertising the society’s latest exhibition. Art and China’s Revolution is a remarkable collection (it runs until January 11) of works dating mainly from the first three decades of the People’s Republic. To see it is to be left in little doubt about the nature of the man in that jacket.

And that’s probably why the Chinese government refused to lend art to this show. The party’s authority is still meant to flow, somehow, from Mao. To admit too much of the past would be awkward. “Thirty percent wrong, 70 percent right” and leave it at that. The killer’s corpse belongs in a criminal’s grave, but rests instead, honored, cherished, embalmed in chemicals and lies, housed on a Tiananmen Square defaced by his image and wrapped in his myth. The state that Mao made has mutated in ways that the People’s Liberator would have detested, but when that increasingly prosperous people buys once-undreamt-of consumer goods they do so with currency carrying the picture of the dictator who consigned 30 million, 40 million, 50 million, who knows, of their compatriots to their deaths: blood money of a sort.

With so much cruelty to choose from, it’s difficult to identify the moment when Mao’s long despotism reached its appalling nadir, but there is something about the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that makes, to use the official euphemism, its “ten-year turbulence” (roughly 1966–76) a repulsively unique period in Chinese history. Far fewer perished (perhaps somewhere between 500,000 and a million; others reckon far more) than in the course of some of Communist China’s earlier horrors, but the scale of its ambitions were more total, and their implications more sinister, than anything seen before or (outside the Khmer Rouge’s copycat Kampuchea) since. Yes, it’s true that the early years of the Soviet revolution were marked by a similar belief that the very essence of man could be refashioned, but, with the exception of the onslaught against religion, the attempts of the Bolshevik intelligentsia to turn millennial delusion into quotidian reality did not survive the ascendancy of Stalin, a cynic who saw a return to cultural conservatism as a way of buttressing his power.

The no-less-cynical Mao took the opposite tack, inciting a revolution from below (“bombard the headquarters”) to eliminate any possible opposition within a leadership increasingly concerned that the Great Helmsman was steering their regime onto the rocks. To the tough Communist apparatchiks at the top of the Chinese party, a charnel-house was, within limits, perfectly acceptable; a mad house was not. Mao appealed over their heads to the educated and semi-educated young with a manipulative rhetoric that combined a dramatic rejection of the past (destroy the “four olds”: old ideas, old culture, old habits, old customs) with the promise of permanent revolution (“to rebel is justified”) and ecstatic mayhem (“be violent”) in one intoxicating, exhilarating mix. The result was a hysterical spasm that devastated an already-ruined nation and, in its wildest extremes, looked to complete the transformation (zàoshén yùndòng) of the Chairman into the living god he was so clearly already becoming. Communism had, for all practical purposes, always been a religion, just never quite so openly.

Like all religions Maoism boasted an iconography, an iconography that is at the heart of the Asia Society show. We see traditional Chinese inkwork superseded by more “modern” painting in oil, its ancient subtleties replaced by the heavy (if occasionally wonderfully executed) didacticism of imported Soviet-style socialist realism. The arrival of the Cultural Revolution is summoned up by a series of fierce woodblock prints (often, interestingly, in the red, white, and black of Hitler’s swastika flag; those colors do the tyrant’s work so well), urgent, violent, inflammatory, deranged, the paper trail of a nation spinning, and being spun, into the abyss: Smash the Cultural Ministry! Smash the Dog Head of Soviet Revisionists! Smash. Struggle. Destroy. Obliterate. Even buildings were not spared: Seventy percent of Peking’s officially designated “places of historical and cultural interest” were destroyed in the frenzy.

Socialist realism meanwhile merged with, in Mao’s approving words, “revolutionary romanticism,” “red, bright, and shining” depictions of a dream world (sometimes almost literally so; check out Zheng Shengtian, Zhou Ruiwen, and Xu Junxuan’s Man’s Whole World is Mutable, Seas Become Mulberry Fields: Chairman Mao Inspects Areas South and North of the Yangtze River), that was, in truth, nightmare, lie, and something far, far stranger still. And as the Red Guards rose and darkness fell, images of that dream, and instructions on how to dream it, were repeated again and again across all media, from paintings, posters, and photography, to opera, to song, to “loyalty dance,” to film, and, most definitely, to the exclusion of everything else. Again and again and again: On some estimates 2.2 billion “official” portraits of Mao were reproduced in one format or another during these years. The print runs of the Christ-Mao of Liu Chunhua’s Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan (1969) are thought to have amounted to 900 million alone. Mao, always Mao: “The world’s red sun” was the focal point of the paintings in which he appeared, glowing with an inner light, an unmistakable hint of the divine reinforced by mists, mountaintops, and suggestions of the miraculous.

And as icons tend to do, these materials offer their viewers a glimpse of an alternative, fantastic reality, in this case a heaven right here on earth. Many are undeniably, if eerily, beautiful. To their credit, the exhibition’s curators supplement them with commentary (as well as some extraordinary, and long-hidden, photography from that era by Li Zhensheng) that leaves little room for ambiguity about what these artworks both represent and disguise. Despite this, the Asia Society’s gift shop still sells bits and pieces of Maoist junk, revolutionary tote bags, enameled portraits of the great man, and a stack of Little Red Books. That’s equivalent to selling Nazi paraphernalia at a museum show dedicated to the art of the Third Reich, but, as is generally the case when it comes to insulting the memory of the victims of Communism, few seem to care: Mao killed millions and all I got was this lousy T-shirt.

The realization that those uncounted tens of millions of Chinese dead do not count for very much is reinforced by the presence in the Asia Society’s foyers of a group of Qu Guangci’s identical stainless-steel statues of Mao. Simultaneously clueless, knowing, and saturated in a borrowed pop-cultural sensibility, these works wink at atrocity. And they are not alone in doing so. They are reminders of the way that China’s younger generation of artists has appropriated Maoist imagery for its own purposes, sometimes satirical, sometimes antic, and sometimes serious, but almost always with an eye on the marketplace. That they find buyers in China is evidence of a country in denial about its past. That they find buyers in London, Paris, and New York reveals something almost as bad, a West where too many are willing to use somebody else’s revolution as a means of self-expression — at a comfortable distance, of course.

To own the latest Maoist pastiche by Wang Guangyi may merely be a matter of status, a refreshingly vulgar assertion of both wealth and (less obviously) taste. Too often, however, it is accompanied by the stale stink of radical chic, a noxious whiff of ’68 that conjures up memories of Berkeley, the Sorbonne, and Western students “carrying pictures,” as the Beatles so acidly sang, “of Chairman Mao.” But to do so was, usually, no more than exhibitionism, less gesture of support for the Cultural Revolution than fashion statement, a painless public proclamation of modish rebelliousness, trendy utopianism, and the hidden self-loathing that lurked within the notion that the West had to look beyond itself for authenticity (whatever that meant). It wasn’t about Mao. It was about “me.” And all those deaths, repressions, and wrecked lives, oh, safely offstage.

They still are.

Loyalty Dance

National Review Online, February 19, 2004

Red-Color News Soldier by Li Zhensheng, Phaidon, 316 pages, $39.95

“A single death,” said Joseph Stalin, who knew a thing or two about such matters, is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.” In trying to understand the holocausts of the last century, it seems to be the individual stories that move us the most. Enormity is best described in miniature. We are aware of the nightmares of Auschwitz, Treblinka, or Belsen, of the crematoria, of the bodies heaped into pits, but to grasp the full horror we turn elsewhere, perhaps to a young girl hidden in Amsterdam, scribbling, scribbling, scribbling as if words would shield her from the doom to come.

As with Nazi slaughter, so it is with the massacres of Communism. In the Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn chronicled the dungeons and killing fields of the Soviet charnel-house, but it is not so much the history as the man we remember, Alexander Isayevich, old Russia’s last hero, the prophet raging at Brezhnev’s squalor, the convict in the camp photo, the alter ego, Ivan Denisovitch, and his quiet day in hell, “a day without a dark cloud. Almost a happy day.”

But if in the West we are, too late and too little, finally coming to grips with the reality of the USSR, its eastern cousin has usually escaped such scrutiny. Oh yes, there will be some who tell tales of Red China’s first ten years (six, seven, eight million dead, maybe more, no one was keeping score) and others, almost certainly specialists in this field, who will whisper (careful, careful, there’s that chance of tenure to consider) about the hecatombs of the Great Leap Forward (twenty-five, thirty million perished, at this point the numbers blur). There are even a few dedicated souls who try to count the cost of the murderous carnival that was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (perhaps one million gone, all on an old man’s whim), an episode of mass psychosis that destroyed the hopes of a generation, and, appallingly, found a wicked echo in the West in the self-indulgent spasm we now call ‘1968′.

But for the most part there is silence, a shrug of the shoulders, indifference, even denial. After all, these awkward events took place so far away, so long ago. Who knows what happened? Who cares? Besides, it is claimed, after warlords and emperors, Mao’s rule was progress of a sort. As for those teeming Chinese, well, their concepts of the individual bear no relation to our own, do they? They were happy, we are told, ecstatic even, in their primitive, but noble, communes, content to be coolies for Communism, wanting nothing more than rice, a little red book and a collective canteen.

Of course, when it comes to the crimes of Communism, we’ve heard similar excuses before, but in the way they are applied to China, it’s difficult not to think that there is something else at play, something racist, an old prejudice dressed up in new progressive clothing.

And there’s no better answer to it than a collection of photographs published late last year. In image after image Red-Color News Soldier reminds us that, beneath the red stars and the blue drab, there were individuals, tormented, tormenting, weeping, cheering, or perhaps just simply numb, staring impassively as some fresh victim is broken before them. This is the Cultural Revolution seen through the eye, and the lens, of one man, Li Zhenseng. It is this personal focus that will give readers greater insight into that time than many more conventional histories filled with the statistics that Stalin so despised.

Li was born, as the Communists liked to say, “in the old society,” the chaotic, war-torn China of 1940, but came of age “under the Red Flag.” Blessed with talent and an appropriately proletarian background, he made his way to film school and a job as the photographer for the principal newspaper in China’s far Northeast. It was 1964, the era of the Socialist Education Movement, Li’s camera records the rallies, military maneuvers, and, with grim inevitability, and in images reminiscent of the Soviet destruction of the kulaks, the persecution of enemies of the people, in this case, “rich peasants.” Two supposed plutocrats are forced to stand for hours, grubby and exhausted in their worn, tired farmer’s clothing, their worn, tired farmers’ heads bowed before a sullen crowd, denounced by a local woman who has managed to whip up tears and indignation for the occasion. There’s a photograph of one of their “mansions,” a rundown house in a rundown village surrounded by a rundown crowd shipped in for the spectacle. Inside, a gorgeous hoard is on display: some shoes, a radio, a leather jacket, and a watch, more than enough to condemn a man.

Less than two years later, Mao launched his cultural revolution. “It is right,” he said, “to rebel,” and that’s what the Chinese did. But this was a curious, twisted rebellion, spontaneous and orchestrated, out of control and carefully directed, grotesque political theater with a cast of millions, inspired, enflamed, and managed by the old monster as a device to destroy his rivals and once more secure his grip over the nation that he had wrecked again, and again and again.

At the beginning, Li was an enthusiast, “excited,” at the prospect of revolutionary renewal, but it isn’t too long before his photographs begin to reveal his doubts. There’s something off-kilter about many of these pictures, a strangeness that goes beyond their bizarre subject matter. Li says now that this was a sign that he was beginning to have his own opinions about what was going on. Even when photographing relatively benign events, of workers, say, singing songs based on the chairman’s slogans, “I frequently tried to choose angles or compositions that showed it was all a bit crazy to me.”

But Li’s resistance, if that’s the word for the actions of a man who even now sometimes seems curiously conflicted about the events of those days, did not stop there. During the Cultural Revolution, “negative images” were prohibited. Photographers might be allowed to attend the festivals of cruelty that defined those years, but they were required to hand over their negatives. “Most followed this order, and in the end their negatives were all set on fire and destroyed.” Li followed a different course. After he had processed his films, he held back some of the negatives, “all those images “beyond the assignment” – the condemnations and the executions” and stashed them away, first in his office, later in a hiding place at his home. Remarkably, over 30,000 of them survived and, excluding whatever may be in China’s official archives, they may be the best remaining record of that terrible time.

Inevitably, the most striking photographs are also the most horrific. We are shown picture after picture of victim after victim, head bowed before the mob or crowned with a dunce’s cap, face and clothes spattered with ink and worse. Li remembers how it was:

The first Red Guard stepped in front of [Ren Zhongyi] with the basin of black ink. He asked Ren to put his hands in the basin and to smear the smelly ink over his own face. But the guard thought he hadn’t smeared it enough, that he didn’t look monstrous enough, so he held up the whole basin and splashed the ink over Ren’s face, his eyes, his nostrils all the way down to the cement floor…As if this was not enough, the first guard then poured half the basin all the way down his neck, the ink dripping down from his waist, along his legs to his feet, and coming out of his blue trousers. I was using black-and-white film, so afterward I could not distinguish between blood, tears, and ink.

In other appalling images, we see prisoners standing silent and shattered as they are denounced for hours before immense crowds. Many bear placards setting out their names and their “crimes.” The names are often crossed out. The implication is clear. These are unpersons. They no longer exist.

However, while it is no justification for the baroque savagery with which he was treated, Ren Zhongyi was a high party official, a man who probably clambered over a mountain of corpses to hold the position he did. More typical, and more tragic, was Wu Bingyuan, a technician accused of counterrevolutionary activities (a pamphlet). Li recalls that when Wu heard his sentence, death, “he looked into the sky and murmured, “this world is too dark”; then he closed his eyes and never in this life reopened them.” The photographs show Wu being paraded through the streets of the city. Later, shackled and bound, he’s pictured at his place of execution. His eyes are still shut. We see him kneeling, back turned to the firing squad. His eyes are still shut. The final image is of Wu’s corpse. His eyes are still shut.

Revolutions devour the best and the brightest, and, for all the lip service–and sometimes more–that Li paid to the spirit of the time, a quick glance at photographs of his likeable, intelligent face, and occasional daring attempts at more stylish dressing, leaves little doubt that he was someone for whom the revolution would eventually come calling. And so it did. By the bleak standards of Mao’s China, he got off quite lightly. He lost his job, and he and his wife were separated from their infant son and exiled to the countryside for “rectification” and an indefinite term of hard labor. Two years later, the death of Lin Biao heralded a slight relaxation in conditions. “The worst of the red storm was over.” Li came home, picked up his life and, once again, his camera.

Towards the end of the book, there are photographs of the ceremonies with which Li’s city marked Mao’s death. Hundreds of thousands gather in a stadium, and there, right in the front row, is Ren Zhongyi, rehabilitated, in charge, and unlike so many of those that his party had condemned, a survivor. Li searches for signs of genuine grief in the crowd but succeeds only in finding one woman “with a few teardrops on her coat.”

Shortly thereafter the party started to deal with the legacy of those years (they were “an error,” it later explained). The new leadership jailed Mao’s widow (and a handful of other ultra-leftists), but the motive for doing so was power politics, not justice. For the millions of victims, there was no recompense, just silence and the occasional scapegoat. The book closes with photographs of the sentencing and execution of an official who rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution. There’s a shot of her standing surrounded by guards. They are dislocating her jaw.

That way, she couldn’t proclaim her innocence.