Ukraine Becomes a War of Attrition on Two Fronts

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The term “special military operation” was not just a euphemism. It also reflected the Kremlin’s hope that it could take Ukraine by means of a swift “decapitation.” Kyiv would be overrun, Ukraine’s leadership would be killed, arrested, or driven into exile, and the country would fall under Russian control. We will never know what was meant to have come next. Two days before the invasion, Russia had recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” that, with Moscow’s backing, had broken away from Ukraine in 2014. Those have since been annexed by Russia, along with Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts (regions), although parts of all these territories are still in Ukrainian hands. Moscow probably always intended that this portion of Ukraine would be transferred to Russia, not least because it constituted a broad land bridge to occupied Crimea…

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The Damage Won’t Be Contained to Afghanistan

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It’s obvious — if not necessarily to the Biden administration — that the success of a nation’s foreign policy depends, in part, on its ability to shape the way in which it is seen abroad. The U.S. was able to ensure the survival of West Berlin — a highly vulnerable exclave — throughout the Cold War in no small part because the Kremlin could never be certain how fiercely America would react if the Soviets attempted to take over the western half of that divided city by force. The Berlin Airlift was an early and remarkable display of support, but the dispatch at the same time of three B-29 bomber groups, which may or may not have been in a position to initiate a nuclear strike, to the U.K. may also have helped persuade Stalin to take things no further. To work, deterrence must be credible. The American, British, and French troops stationed in West Berlin for decades were no more than a tripwire, but Moscow could only speculate about what would follow from triggering it. It never took the risk.

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Good Fences, Bad Neighbor

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In the aftermath of Russia’s takeover of Crimea, there were widespread fears that the Baltic states, notwithstanding their membership in NATO, might be next. As Aliide Naylor relates in The Shadow in the East, those fears have since eased, but extreme vulnerability (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia could be overrun in days) and constant low- and not-so-low-level Russian aggression against the Baltic trio continue to keep nerves on edge.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine has forced NATO to relearn the power of symbolism. Several thousand troops from other NATO allies are now present in the Baltic states at any time, a reminder that the guarantee contained in Article 5 of the NATO treaty (an attack on one NATO country is to be treated as an attack on all) also extends to the alliance’s northeastern marches. Their numbers are tiny: no more, Naylor explains, than “a tripwire, unable to resist Russia’s military might in the event of a full-scale invasion — but thus far they have served as an effective deterrent.”

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