Grade School

National Review, February 6, 2012

Niagara Falls, October 1989  © Andrew Stuttaford

When watching a disaster movie it’s occasionally worth pausing to take stock of where the main drama, obscured by subplots, rubble, and confusion, really stands.

Standard & Poor’s announcement, on, suitably, Friday the 13th, that it had downgraded nine euro-zone countries in various disapproving ways was a chance for just such a moment. S&P’s stripping France and Austria of their highly prized triple-A ratings grabbed the headlines. The downgrades of less-than‒Black Card nations such as Cyprus, Italy, and Spain (each down two notches, to BB+, BBB+, and A, respectively) added the clickety-click of tumbling dominoes to the story. But most striking of all was the rating agency’s release of answers to questions it anticipated it would be asked about the downgrades, answers that portrayed the euro-zone crisis in ways that Angela Merkel, in particular, will not have wanted to hear.

This mess is not, explained S&P, just about the debt. While their governments’ “lack of fiscal prudence” had undeniably played a part in some countries’ arrival in the PIIGS sty, not least in the case of a certain Hellenic Republic, this was not always the case. “Spain and Ireland . . . ran an average fiscal deficit of 0.4% of GDP and a surplus of 1.6% of GDP, respectively, [between] 1999 [and] 2007,” a period in which, the agency added, a touch cattily, Germany had run a deficit averaging 2.3 percent.

So what had gone wrong? S&P makes coy references to “boom-time developments” and “the rapid expansion of European banks’ balance sheets,” but appears unwilling to spell out too bluntly how the mirage -- promoted in Brussels, Frankfurt, and elsewhere -- of economic convergence (and whispered hints of mutual support) within the euro zone did so much to set in motion the spree of mispriced lending (Irish real estate is just one of many hideous examples) that has now unraveled to such destructive effect.

That’s a shame, because publicizing the truth about those years might have helped counteract the notion, heavily pushed by the EU’s elite, that the euro zone’s troubles are the result of market failure, when in fact they are the product of just the opposite. The devastation of recent years is in no small part the consequence of economic reality’s finally returning to a space from which it had been barred by the introduction of a “one size fits all” currency that was, of course, nothing of the sort. Perhaps S&P was concerned that dwelling too much on the misdeeds of the past might further infuriate a euro-zone leadership that has fallen menacingly out of love with the rating agencies that were once its accomplices (less than two years ago S&P was, remarkably, still treating Greek debt as “investment grade”) but are now, belatedly, stumbling along the road to long-overdue repentance.

Instead, the agency looks forward. As mirages tend to do, convergence is receding: “The key underlying issue for the eurozone as a whole is one of a growing [emphasis added] divergence in competitiveness between the core and the so-called ‘periphery.’” Indeed it is, and, with monetary union meaning that the zone’s weaker members are unable to devalue themselves back into contention, any reversal of this process will be extraordinarily difficult, if not close to impossible. And, as things now stand, they may no longer even be given the opportunity to try.

Up until now the PIIGS (as S&P does not call them) have been able to manage their “underperformance . . . (manifest in sizeable external deficits) because of funding by the banking systems of the more competitive northern Eurozone economies.” That party is now over.

So what to do? S&P argues that “a greater pooling of fiscal resources and obligations as well as enhanced mutual budgetary oversight” could buoy confidence and cut the cost of borrowing for the euro zone’s weaker brethren. What these arrangements would look like is not spelled out. What they would not look like is the misshapen agreement that slunk out of Brussels in early December, a pact that S&P clearly views as too little, too vague, and too stingy.

Thus, the rating agency is understandably skeptical about whether plans to advance the start date of the €500 billion European Stability Mechanism (the permanent bailout fund designed to replace the existing €440 billion European Financial Stability Facility) by twelve months, to July 2012, will make much of a difference. Tactfully enough, S&P does not speculate whether its own downgrading of some of the countries that stand behind the ESM will make that almost certainly inadequate entity’s job even more trying. In case you wondered, it will. And in case there was any doubt about that, on January 16, S&P downgraded the EFSF.

Although it never comes out and directly says so, S&P seems to want today’s currency union to evolve into something far closer to the Brussels dream (and democratic nightmare), a fiscal union that would be the logical complement to a monetary union encompassing 17 different countries. Left unstated, but surely implicit, is that this process would be preceded by the firing of the long-awaited, effectively German-underwritten “bazooka,” the resort (however artfully described) to the monetary printing press on a scale thought (fingers crossed) to be sufficient to extinguish the euro’s growing fever. The fever is one thing, but curing the underlying disease -- the competitiveness chasm -- would be the work of generations (how long do you think it would take to build a Portugal that could keep pace with the Netherlands?), and would be an immense challenge to the social and political order in countries struggling to adapt to the theoretically admirable disciplines of a currency for which they are in fact very poorly suited.

Meanwhile, even if they can get past historic memories of what Weimar’s printing presses eventually led to, the prospect of paying for what will be, by any reasonable reckoning, a prolonged, expensive longshot is something that horrifies the taxpayers in Germany (and elsewhere in the euro zone’s north) who would be stumping up the cash. That’s why Angela Merkel, a trial-and-error politician at the best of times, will give every alternative approach a go before marching her country down a route that would enrage the electorate that is supposed to be reelecting her in 2013.

But no other alternative is likely to provide much relief for long. S&P warns that “a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone” may well prove self-defeating. However overdue they are, and however necessary they may be to sell the bailout parade to northern voters, austerity programs on the scale now being implemented in the PIIGS suck money, confidence, and demand out of their already battered economies. They shrink the tax base to such an extent that higher rates cannot compensate for falling revenues. Policies designed to cut deficits may actually end up increasing them. The PIIGS will have been chasing their own tails.

The markets understand this well. That’s why those PIIGS that can still tap the international markets have been finding it so expensive to do so. And that’s why there is such limited trust in a European banking system (already enfeebled by the 2008–09 financial debacle) that is, directly or indirectly, dangerously exposed to the woes of the euro zone’s laggards. And when there is limited trust in the banks, credit begins to freeze up. And when credit freezes, economies slow. And when economies slow, tax revenues decline. And when they do, bad deficits get worse. And, and, and . . .

If there’s one scrap of comfort to be found in S&P’s ruminations, it is in its observation that the European Central Bank has staved off “a collapse in market confidence” by a series of measures designed to prop up the EU’s banking system. Basically, the ECB has supplied Europe’s banks with large amounts of low-priced, comparatively lightly collateralized funding that, in December, grew to include €500 billion in three-year money -- and there will be more such bonanzas to come this year. That this may have left the ECB’s balance sheet looking like the books of an unusually generous pawnbroker is a problem, but it is a problem for another day.

All that money has bought some confidence, but not, unfortunately, a lot. Contrary probably to the hopes of the ECB, the banks have not been lured into using these cheap funds to “invest” in high-yielding government bonds issued by the likes of Italy. Instead the cash just piles up -- much of it, ironically, back at the ECB -- as nervous bankers wait for the crisis in which Angela Merkel is forced to choose between deploying the bazooka that saves the euro zone but destroys her career and (much, much less likely) abandoning the euro zone and taking a leap into the unknown.

That crisis will arrive. It could be triggered by Greece, which is teetering, as I write, on the edge of disorderly default, or maybe a spreading bank run will do the trick. There are plenty of possibilities to choose from. And that’s before the black swans come into view.

Clickety-click.

Euro Melee

National Review, December 1, 2011 (December 19, 2011 issue) 

Brussels, July 1985 © Andrew Stuttaford

The euro may not have brought Europe together, except in shared misery, but it has divided it in previously unimaginable ways. Votes can now be won in Finland by bashing faraway Greece, a place hitherto thought of in Helsinki (if at all) as a helpful supplier of beaches. Europe being Europe, the troubles of the single currency have also given a boost to more traditional antagonisms and, Europe being Europe, revived plans for a nasty new tax.

That tax, the financial-transaction tax, is now being pushed by Germany (with France scampering behind). Britain, already in the doghouse for allegedly not doing enough to help out the single currency it had rejected, is talking veto, while Germany, being Germany, is threatening to proceed regardless. Fleet Street being Fleet Street, there are warnings of a “Fourth Reich.” Many Greeks are saying (and shouting) the same thing, much to the fury of those German taxpayers bailing out a nation they see as idle, dishonest, ungrateful, and — old prejudices bubble up — a little too swarthy to be trusted.

It’s time to calm down. The financial-transaction tax is a thoroughly bad idea, with a dose of old-fashioned national nastiness thrown in (Britain would pick up a huge percentage of the tab), but Merkel’s demands for better budgetary discipline within the eurozone are, in theory, rather more easy to justify. If Germany is, one way or another, to underwrite the common currency, insisting that its money is not frittered away is good housekeeping, not empire-building. Not an empire in any traditional sense.

But Merkel is pfennig-wise but mark foolish (or she would be if such splendidly sound money still existed). She is set on defending Germany’s interests, but only within the parameters of the EU’s transnationalist, post-democratic agenda, to which, it seems, she subscribes. The appealing idea that Germany should, for its own good, quit the eurozone, either alone or in the company, say, of the frugal Dutch, remains off limits, and there is absolutely no prospect that Germany’s voters will be given any direct say on that topic. They never wanted the euro, but they got it. Now they are stuck with it.

And that’s how the EU, born out of a distrust of nation-states and their voters, was always meant to work. The difficulty for Brussels is that this system is now being tested as never before: The eurozone has become the site of a dangerous, chaotic, and half-hidden power struggle between its political and bureaucratic leaderships (which are themselves deeply divided on how far to take deeper integration, but that’s mainly a tale for another day), nervous financial markets, and increasingly riled-up voters.

This wasn’t on the program. To the extent that Brussels had any strategy at the time of the single currency’s launch beyond finger-crossing and prayer, it was that the eurozone’s inherently flawed nature (very different economies joined in monetary, but not fiscal, union) would eventually lead to an over-by-Christmas “beneficial crisis.” Financial markets would force through the closer fiscal union that politics could not deliver. Once that had been achieved, the zone’s individual nation-states would count for very little, and their voters for even less.

That’s not how it has worked out. The mechanics of currency union (more on that later) have combined with irresponsible sovereign borrowing and the economic horrors of recent years to foment a financial storm that may be too devastating to be harnessed in quite so “beneficial” a way. The crisis could yet work out (in that cynical Eurocratic sense), but the terrible damage it has already caused has driven home the real costs — political, economic, and financial — of the monetary union to electorates that have long been denied an effective say in its future. Now that they know what they now know, it will be more difficult to keep them on the sidelines.

But over in the PIIGS they are still huddled there for now. In the last few weeks, Prime Ministers Berlusconi and Papandreou have been forced out with shocking ease, replaced by technocrats bearing the Brussels stamp. Italy was issued a former EU commissioner, and Greece a former vice president of the European Central Bank. Neither man had previously been elected to anything. Who cares? The message to Italian and Greek voters was clear — beggars cannot expect to be, so to speak, choosers — and so far surprisingly few of the beggars have objected. So long as it is seen to be better to be in the zone than out, hairshirts and all, this argument will fly. Underlining this, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland have all held elections, and, in each case, the electorate supported austerity. But if virtue’s reward is too long delayed, that consensus could easily shift, and if that change in sentiment is not addressed by those in charge, there could well be serious disorder.

A kinder, gentler eurozone, fueled by the printing presses of a looser, laxer European Central Bank and, once fiscal union has been safely set up, significantly higher transfers from the frugal “north” to the PIIGS, might be one way of smoothing the path to some sort of recovery. But the rise of the populist True Finns, the collapse of the Slovak government, and the continuing success of Holland’s Euroskeptical Geert Wilders all suggest that growing numbers of northern voters are in not such a generous mood. The only fiscal union they would be likely to support would be more Scrooge than Santa. These voters are signing checks, not receiving them. Their concerns ought to count for far more than those of the pauperized periphery. And they just might.

Even in Germany, there is some evidence that portions of the overwhelmingly Eurofederalist political class are becoming unnerved not only by popular discontent (as a proxy for that, nearly 80 percent of German voters are opposed to the issuance of Eurobonds guaranteed by all the eurozone’s members) but also by clear signals of unease from the country’s powerful constitutional court over the liabilities Germany may be taking on. Merkel’s grudging responses to the bailout requests of the last two years may have been an attempt to maintain financial discipline, but they are also a recognition that her domestic voters once again count for something. And maintaining that tough stance is playing well at home. According to a new ZDF poll, the percentage of German voters who approve of Merkel’s handling of the crisis has risen sharply (from 45 to 63 percent) over the last month.

To the extent that Merkel is a fan too of a Scrooge-style fiscal union, this may actually strengthen her hand as the eurozone’s bad cop. That’s something that alarms another key participant in this drama: the financial markets. Market players are fond of a quick fix. They are not very interested in the plight of the eurozone voter. Most are pushing for closer integration (preferably Santa-style) as the only way to make the single currency work. Merkel has not appreciated this pressure, or the turbulence that has come with it, and she is not alone. The currency union echoes with the rage of a European political/bureaucratic class that prefers to blame the crisis on wicked “Anglo-Saxon” speculators rather than on overspending and the shortcomings of a gimcrack currency union that should never have seen the light of day.

And it’s in the operation of the latter that the immediate danger lies. As Paul de Grauwe of Belgium’s University of Leuven has noted, if markets panic about one of the eurozone’s members, euros will pour out of that country (let’s call it Greece), and unless that flow is somehow reversed, that country (unable to print its own money) will simply run out of cash, and it will go bust. As I said, let’s call it Greece.

That gives markets the whip hand, and that does not play well on a continent that has never really shaken off its command-and-control traditions. So long as financial markets bought into the euro dream, their exuberance was welcome and, indeed, encouraged in Brussels, Frankfurt, and elsewhere. There were few complaints about ratings agencies, banks, or speculators back then. Now the bubble has burst. The markets have woken up, and, as we all know, the results have not been pretty to see — and they are visible to all.

This has not pleased the eurozone’s leaders one bit. They have responded with an onslaught of measures — from bans on certain kinds of short sales, to the financial-transaction tax, and, even, an aborted plan to censor the ratings agencies — all designed to throw sand in the gears of the free market, cut financiers (whose pay, even higher than that of the Brussels elite, has long been a source of irritation) down to size, and, in particular, give those semi-detached Brits, arrogant Yanks, the greedy City, and even greedier Wall Street a very good kicking.

To be continued . . .

Tango Lesson

The Weekly Standard, December 12, 2011

Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

There are good days and bad days, but even on the good days the abyss is never too far away. The eurozone’s dangerously original mix of innovation, incoherence, and unaccountability makes it difficult to identify a single event that could finally push it over the edge. But, with confidence already shot, there is one obvious contender, a series of old-fashioned bank runs given a brutal new twist by the logic of currency union as cash pours out of the stricken banks and the country (or countries) that hosts them. Unless the European Central Bank could show that it has what it really takes, fear would feed on itself, credit markets would seize up, and that, quite possibly, would be that.

The extra liquidity offered by the Fed and other central banks on November 30 was a sensible precautionary move, but its extent and its timing were clear signs of anxiety that, while the eurozone’s leadership moves from grand plan to grand plan, the building blocks of disaster are falling into place. U.S. institutions are wary about extending short-term funding to many European banks. European banks are wary about lending to each other.

Of all the sickly banks surviving on the Rube Goldberg life support systems now being deployed in the eurozone’s grisly ER, Greece’s are probably (and the implications of that “probably” are appalling) the most vulnerable to the panic that could set everything off. Their country is the closest to default. If Greece goes under, its banks will, without fresh capital, go under too. So what are their depositors doing?

They are not yet running. But they are walking away at an ever quicker pace (deposits have fallen by over 20 percent since January 2010) that can only have accelerated since the moment in early November when Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy first conceded that a country’s eurozone membership might not be irrevocable after all.

To understand just how bad things could get, the best place to look is Argentina in early 2001. In 1991, just 10 years before, Latin America’s most gorgeously faded republic had decided to turn over its latest new leaf. It linked its peso to the dollar at a 1:1 exchange rate. This peg was backed by reserves held by a currency board. Despite its distinctly permissive, distinctly Argentine, characteristics, it was designed to use external market pressure to force the country into the tough financial discipline that it had found impossible to impose upon itself. Those Greeks who regarded the EU’s single currency as something more than a free lunch supported signing up for the euro for pretty much the same reason.

At first, the Argentine experiment worked well. The economy grew briskly, and foreign lenders were pleased to feed its growth in a manner well beyond the capability of Argentina’s relatively small banking sector. After all, they told themselves, the country had changed its ways, and, thanks to the peg, exchange risk had been hugely reduced. What could go wrong? If you think that sounds a lot like the talk that accompanied the prolonged surge in international lending to Hungary, Latvia, Greece, Ireland, and all the other future catastrophes crowded into the euro’s waiting room (and, subsequently in some cases, the eurozone itself) just a few years later, you’d be quite right.

What could go wrong, did: Deep-seated structural flaws within the local economy, a series of external shocks (starting with the Mexican crisis of 1994), weaker commodity prices, and stresses flowing from the fact that the dollar and the peso were an ill-matched pair all combined to push the country into difficulties made cataclysmic by ultimately unsustainable levels of foreign debt. Private lenders shied away. Private capital fled. Taxpayers hid. Ratings agencies screamed. The cost of borrowing soared. The resemblance to Greece in 2011 is unmistakable. Interestingly, the Argentine storm was gathering strength at the same time as Greece was being accepted, not without controversy, into the eurozone, raising the question what in Hades the EU’s leadership was playing at. The implicit warning for Greece contained in the Argentine disaster was as clear as Cassandra, and just as ignored.

In any event, as the 20th century lurched into the 21st, Buenos Aires previewed Athens. There were differences, of course, not least the fact that Argentina had hung on to its own national currency, but that meant less than it might have done. By the end of the 1990s, 90 percent of Argentina’s public debt was denominated in a foreign currency, marginally better than Greece’s 100 percent (for these purposes the euro is a “foreign” currency everywhere), but not by enough to give any comfort. And it wasn’t just the debt: Wide swaths of the economy had been dollarized.

And so had the banks: According to the IMF, close to 60 percent of the Argentine banking system’s assets and liabilities were denominated in dollars throughout the second half of the 1990s, leaving the banks horribly exposed in the event that the peg broke. Indeed, the potentially enormous cost of breaking the peg was a good part of why it was maintained, a logic similar to that now keeping the embattled PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) on the euro’s leash. This should come as no surprise: The stability that such mechanisms can bring largely rests on the absence of any obvious exits. Countries that sign up for them need to be sure that they have what it takes to stay the course. Slinking in on fudged numbers and, ludicrously, expected to maintain some sort of pace with Germany’s Porsche economy, the Greek jalopy stood even less of a chance than had far-better-intentioned Argentina.

Argentine headlines in 2000-01 must have read much like those in Greece today. The country accepted billions in international assistance (from the IMF) in exchange for the imposition of austerity measures that pummeled an already faltering economy. There was a voluntary debt swap (on terms as absurdly expensive as those proposed for Greece earlier this year) that bought time, but no confidence.

Massively widening spreads between peso and dollar debt signaled the market’s fear that the peg was doomed. But, to quote the IMF’s invaluable Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina (approved by one Timothy Geithner), it was “the resumption [in July 2001] of large scale withdrawals from Argentine banks [that was] perhaps the clearest sign of the system’s impending collapse.” Indeed it was.

The banks—and, of course, the country itself—were quite literally running out of the dollars that made up a monetary base already depleted by previous capital flight, and a growing current account deficit. The rules of a currency board (even in its looser Argentine variant) meant that it was not possible simply to print money to fill the gap. This is a problem familiar to those of today’s PIIGS who have to watch the money drain out of their economies, yet are blocked from direct access to the printing press by the European Central Bank. Argentina’s more sinuous treasuries (provincial and then national) tried to meet this challenge by issuing a series of evocatively named quasi-monies (IOUs, basically), but these patacones, porteños, quebrachos, and lecops were harbingers of doom, not a solution.

And when the dominoes of finance finally fall, they fall quickly. To return to the IMF’s grim textbook: “The crisis broke with a run [on] private sector deposits, which fell by more than $3.6 billion (6 percent of the deposit base) during November 28-30.” At that point the game was up. The authorities’ response (notably the introduction of the corralito) should alarm depositors throughout the PIIGS as they mull how their governments might stop precious euros escaping to safe havens abroad in the wake of bank runs at home.

The corralito limited cash withdrawals from individual bank accounts to the equivalent of $250 a week (the dollar value would soon fall sharply). And the response to it should worry those now running the PIIGS. Argentinians took to the streets and reduced the country’s political order to chaos. Depending on how you define the term, Argentina had five presidents in less than a month, but none could change the inevitable. The country defaulted on its debt, the peg was scrapped, the peso tanked, and the corralito was replaced by the corralón, the centerpiece of an even tougher regime. Depositors were allowed to withdraw a little more money than before, but only in heavily depreciated pesos. Term deposits were frozen, and transfers of money out of the country heavily restricted. Not so long after, dollar deposits were switched into pesos, and the ruin of Argentine savers, many of whom lost their jobs as the economy crashed, was complete.

History does not always repeat itself. Maybe those remaining Greek depositors are confident that, however battered their nation’s finances, its guarantee of bank deposits up to some $135,000 will hold up through the toughest times. Maybe they have faith that Greece will stick with the euro. And maybe they trust that, should the walk from Greek banks turn into a run, the European Central Bank will do what it takes to put things right. But if they do have any doubts, they can, for now, easily move their euros to a part of the eurozone—Germany, say—where there is no currency risk and bank deposits are blessed with a guarantor that is, you know, solvent. Thinking like that is how a run on the banks can begin. Paranoid? Well, if you were a depositor with a Greek bank, what would you do?

And, if you were a depositor in an Italian bank, watching all this and aware that money is ebbing away from Italy too, what would you do?

I know what the Argentine advice would be. Run.

And if the Greeks run, and the Italians run, who will be next?

Cristina’s Whirl

National Review, November 10, 2011 (November 28, 2011 issue)

Montserrat, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

If you want to understand why Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner triumphed quite so conclusively (with 54 percent of the vote against 17 percent for her nearest challenger) in October’s presidential election, the University of Buenos Aires’s Museum of Foreign Debt is a splendid place to start. That such an institution exists says nothing good about Argentine financial history. What it contains suggests yet more turbulence ahead.

San Telmo, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

The museum is a showplace for an unconvincing national alibi. Argentina is innocent and maligned, its tale not one of squandered wealth, but of victimhood, as it is repeatedly plundered by Anglo-Saxon (of course!) financiers, helped in later years by their stooges at the IMF. Under Juan Peron, however, things had been different. During the Peronato, the foreign debt was repaid. Indeed it was, but (as is not explained in the museum) that owed more to the capital surpluses built up during World War II than to Peronism’s autarkic economic model, which was in deep trouble by the time its creator was deposed in 1955. No matter, Peron’s curious mix of fascism, corporatism, and Evita has never quite lost its grip on a nation forever searching for a magical solution to its largely self-inflicted woes. And now, a decade of growth under a new generation of Peronists has convinced many Argentinians that the conjurer-caudillo was on to something.

It’s hard to blame them. Just ten years ago, the botched free-market experimentation of the 1990s had pushed Argentina into the abyss. It began well enough, but pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar (a key part of the process, and the wrong currency to choose) without sufficient structural reform left Argentina increasingly uncompetitive. Lower export prices and successive emerging-markets crises in the latter part of the decade made matters worse. The country’s budget swung wildly off-kilter. Spending was too high, tax revenues too low. Foreign lenders filled much of the gap. Today’s Greeks know how the story ends. They should also note this: Billions in additional borrowing and belated attempts at austerity were not enough to put things right. The economy plunged. Capital fled. In December 2001, the government introduced the corralito (later toughened into the corralon), a measure that (more or less) froze all bank accounts. Argentina went into default shortly thereafter.

This remains (fingers crossed) the largest sovereign-debt default ($95 billion) in history. The dollar peg was dropped a few weeks later; the peso crumpled. Dollar deposits in Argentine banks were swapped into hugely depreciated pesos, a precedent that ought to alarm savers in the eurozone’s PIIGS. If the drachma and its feeble kin are to return, there will be corralitos first. Depositors have been abandoning their banks in Greece, Ireland, and elsewhere. Who can blame them?

Image of Nestor Kirchner outside Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, August  2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

San Telmo, Buenoa Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

Argentina’s financial breakdown had been accompanied by trouble in the streets and chaos in the corridors of power. Depending on how the term “president” is defined, the country had as many as five of them within two weeks. The last was Eduardo Duhalde, appointed interim president by the legislative assembly. After elections 16 months later, he was succeeded by Nestor Kirchner, a Left-Peronist governor from refreshingly distant Patagonia. The fever had broken. Argentina took a mulligan. Private savers had been crushed, and much of the middle class was pushed into poverty, but many businesses were saved by the effective “devaluation” of their debt. Peso collapse bailed out exporters and local manufacturers battered by the once-overvalued currency, as did a reviving economy fueled by the accelerating global commodity boom (Argentina is a major food exporter) and increased government spending. That spending was financed by the fruits of recovery, the windfall from taxes on those ever-more-valuable food exports and, in a sense, the lower debt burden that was default’s naughty reward. In 2005, Argentina repaid its IMF loans ahead of schedule. Kirchner no longer intended to listen to the organization’s nasty “neo-liberal” advice.

Growth continued to soar. Kirchner would have won comfortable reelection in 2007, but stood aside for his wife, Cristina, an abrasive would-be Evita, but without her cult appeal. Only a few months after taking office, she lost a brutal fight with farmers over plans to hike export taxes, a defeat that contributed to her allies’ taking a hit in nationwide legislative elections in 2009. In a tango variant of the Putin-Medvedev waltz, Nestor Kirchner was due to succeed his wife as their party’s candidate in the presidential elections in 2011, but ended up doing something even more useful for the cause: He died last year, aged only 60.

Eternauta Kirchner, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

Tragedy is often a vote winner, and particularly so in a place like enthusiastically morbid, histrionic Argentina. Cristina’s approval ratings jumped 25 points. As a character in a novel by Argentine author Tomas Eloy Martinez once said, “Every time a corpse enters the picture in this country, history goes mad.” A black-clad Cristina threw her widow’s weeds into the political battle with aplomb, gusto, and tears. Nestor (“he is watching, he is here, isn’t he?”) haunted her speeches and her rallies, transformed into the lost leader who sacrificed all. It worked. Wander around Buenos Aires, a city more skeptical about the Kirchners than most, and you will see numerous stenciled graffiti of Nestor as El Eternauta, an iconic Argentine cartoon figure who traveled through time and space, and to the left. Cristina, already Evita, also became Juan to Nestor’s Evita, keeper of the martyr-spouse’s flame.

Nestor Kirchner, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

The economy lent a large hand. By year’s end, GDP will have grown by over 90 percent since its 2002 nadir. The spoils of success have been spread around. Thanks to better times, unemployment has been more than halved from 2002’s 20 percent. The number of those in poverty has fallen sharply. Income inequality has shrunk. Social spending has leapt. The descendants of Evita’s descamisados (the shirtless) knew whom to thank. Throw in a divided and uninspiring opposition, and the rest was victory.

The worry is what comes next. Growth is forecast to ease to a still impressive 4–5 percent in 2012 (after a little over 8 percent this year), but envious PIIGS should be aware that there’s plenty of snake oil in the Kirchner cure, and danger too. Revving up the demand side can work (and has worked), as can devaluation, but, like steroids, such policies are best not overdone. And they have been overdone. Officially running at a fantasy-math 10 percent, inflation is now thought to stand at around 25 percent, a level that has been eroding the devaluation advantage (the trade balance has deteriorated in recent years). Price controls, whether direct (such as those on utilities) or indirect (export taxes), have merely forced this inflation to express itself through shortages and underinvestment, a variant of the distortions now emerging as a result of the country’s growing protectionist tilt.

Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

Recoleta, Buenos Aires, August 2011 © Andrew Stuttaford

With public spending still roaring ahead, a cash crunch is drawing closer, exacerbated by the way that the 2001 default and its heavily litigated aftermath have (and perhaps this is just as well) constrained access to international capital markets. The government has taken to raiding the central bank’s foreign-currency reserves to pay those overseas debts it does acknowledge. In a different smash-and-grab, private pension funds worth $24 billion were nationalized in 2008 (in the pensioners’ best interest, of course), a move that also boosted the state’s ability to meddle in some of the country’s largest companies, a temptation that it will probably find difficult to resist: The Kirchner years have already seen the outright nationalization of a number of enterprises.

The markets have read the runes: Foreign direct investment in Argentina has slowed sharply and the locals have followed suit. Capital flight is accelerating and is now estimated at $3 billion per month, something that has provoked a draconian response, even if reserves (for now) remain reasonably healthy. Just after the election, Kirchner launched a new series of initiatives designed to bring dollars back home. These included ordering the country’s energy and mining businesses to repatriate their export revenues, and compelling insurance companies to cash in their foreign investments by year’s end.

These diktats were another display of an authoritarianism that has become more visible as the economic miracle comes under pressure. Economists have been fined for publishing inflation data that differ from the official spin. The inconveniently independent president of the central bank was forced out with the assistance of questionably legal maneuvers. The tactics deployed in the long struggle against the giant Clarín media group have become ever rougher, and show little respect for the idea of a free press. Under the circumstances, Kirchner’s fondness for Hugo Chávez is no surprise, nor is her recourse to conjuring up a handy foreign devil: that “crude colonial power in decline,” Malvinas-stealing Britain.

This is unlikely to end well.

Right but Repulsive

Peter Oborne and Frances Weaver: Guilty Men

The Weekly Standard, October 31, 2011

A doctor ignored by a smoker won’t celebrate if lung cancer strikes. Britain’s euroskeptics are generally too worried about the consequences of the Eurozone’s thoroughly predictable crisis to submit to the temptations of I told you so.

Well, most of them are. The United Kingdom may be outside the Eurozone, but some British Banquos have managed to crash its beggar’s banquet nonetheless. One, Foreign Secretary William Hague, has compared the currency union to “a burning building with no exits.” He can be forgiven his bluntness. As Tory leader, he had said the same and much more besides when that ill-fated building was still under construction. The reward for his prescience was to have his words used against him as part of a vicious and deceptive campaign that failed in its specific objective, yet succeeded in a wider task: contributing to a political and cultural climate that doomed Hague to vilification and defeat in the 2001 general election, and Britain to years more of Tony Blair.

That campaign—to persuade Britons to adopt the euro—has now been retrieved from the memory hole and made the subject of Guilty Men (Centre for Policy Studies), a brutal, brilliant new pamphlet by Frances Weaver, a freelance writer and researcher, and Peter Oborne, the Daily Telegraph’s chief political commentator. The title is provocation and insult. Published in 1940, the original Guilty Men was a savage, if not always accurate, attack on British politicians of the appeasement era. To revive its name was to hurl down a gauntlet.

Guilty Men should be seen as the third in an Oborne trilogy that began with The Rise of Political Lying (2005). That volume and The Triumph of the Political Class (2007) are two of the finest books on British politics in recent years. Their titles speak for themselves, and their message ought to resonate far beyond Britain. The same is true of Guilty Men. Within its covers you will find the description of an elite unimpressed by its homeland, enthralled by transnationalism, seduced by the main chance, and buttressed by a mistaken conventional wisdom that it chose to defend by any means possible. None of this, of course, could ever happen here.

Like all the best thrillers, Guilty Men begins with a dastardly foreign plot. In its introduction, Peter Jay, a distinguished journalist and a former British ambassador to the United States, describes a lunch in Paris he attended as a 15-year-old in 1952. The guest of honor was the French diplomat Jean Monnet, the man who launched what eventually became the European Union. Dismayed by the spectacle of a France now eclipsed by the United States and Soviet Union, Monnet apparently explained that the only way that la gloire could return to France was within a Greater Europe. But this would have to be a superpower created gradually and by indirection, “by zig and by zag,” until, as Jay puts it, “the walls of old-fashioned national sentiment collapsed in favor of a new focus of national unity, Europe itself.”

In the nearly 60 years that have followed, there has been plenty of zig, and plenty of zag, and rather too much European Union, but the United States of Europe has yet to emerge. And as for “the dimension of empire” that EU Commission president José Manuel Barroso claimed to detect within Brussels’s realm back in 2007, well. . . .

Critically, there is, to borrow the unkind observation of Václav Klaus, the Czech Republic’s splendidly Thatcherite president, “no European demos—and no European nation.” There are, of course, the institutions—the parliament, the Commission, and so on—and the pretensions and the massive regulatory overreach. There’s a pretty flag and, via Beethoven and Rhodesia, a nice enough anthem, but that’s about it. To the extent that there is any European patriotism beyond the expensively furnished lairs of the upscale and, let’s concede the point, some genuine enthusiasm for Europe’s Ryder Cup golf team, it finds its most powerful expression in, significantly, something negative—distaste for the United States. These are too-flimsy foundations on which to build a challenge to the world’s colossi.

Thus it was not some atavistic dream of empire that persuaded so many of Britain’s best and brightest to rally behind the campaign to sign their country up for a shoddily constructed currency that was, whatever Paul Volcker (oh yes) might have said, clearly ill-suited to the U.K. economy. For some, career was the motive, and not only in an obvious way. Brussels can pay well, directly and indirectly, but, more than that, opposition to the euro had been cleverly smeared as a badge of the bizarre, an ornament to no résumé worth having.

The sharply told tale of how the opponents of the Eurozone’s madhouse money came to be regarded as nuts takes up some of the most interesting sections of Guilty Men, but it’s worth pausing to note how the structure of Britain’s politics and media makes it easier to manipulate public opinion there than in the United States. Power is much more centralized. There are fewer movers and shakers who need to be convinced. There are no awkward states to cajole. The press is ideologically diverse, but television and radio matter far more, and in broadcast the loudest voice is that of the officially nonpartisan, taxpayer-funded BBC, a megaphone for the pieties and prejudices of the soft left. There is no meaningful equivalent to Fox News or America’s gung-ho Genghis talk radio to bite back. And at the time when the euro wars were at their most intense, the blogosphere was still being born, and Twitter had yet to hatch.

The BBC had therefore an immense advantage, and it abused it. In the course of one nine-week period in 2000 on BBC Radio 4’s influential Today program, Oborne and Weaver record, “the case for the euro was represented by twice as many [speakers], interviews, and soundbites [as] the case against.” That’s not the end of it. A controversy can be defined by the way that it is framed by the media. When euroskeptics were heard on the BBC, it was often in the context of hugely exaggerated reports of splits within Conservative ranks over the single currency. A divided party is electoral poison, and the splits became the story. The argument against abandoning the pound was shelved for another day.

Word games of a type all too familiar from America’s mainstream media were deployed (it was euroskeptics who were the “hardliners”). Scare stories of the terrible fate that awaited Britain outside the Eurozone made headlines, inconvenient statistics that cast doubt upon them were buried. If you think that sounds a lot like much of the American media’s treatment of the global warming debate, you’re correct.

The BBC was not the only prominent media institution to play these tricks. The Financial Times is widely perceived as authoritative, serious, informed, the voice of British business, the house journal of the City. It is meant to be something more than a mere newspaper. Oborne and Weaver demonstrate how, when it came to the euro, it was very much less. Not all its writers played along, but too often the Financial Times resorted to a camouflaged advocacy journalism that may even, ironically, have contributed to the Eurozone’s present mess. How many bankers will have read the paper’s ecstatic accounts of the euro’s progress and felt just that much better about lending to Greece, Ireland, or Portugal? What could go wrong? On May 26, 2008, the FT ran a leading article with a headline that included these words: “Europe’s currency union has been a remarkable success.” Remarkable indeed. Less than two years later the first Greek bailout was under way.

With such purportedly fair-minded grandees lending weight to the cause of the euro, and the Tories burdened by the irrational popular loathing that had swept them out of office, the vitriol of more openly partisan journalists came to be treated by many as something approaching gospel. In its viciousness their work anticipated the high-minded nastiness seen in the coverage of the Tea Party a decade or so later. Weaver and Oborne have plenty of examples showing just how low reputedly respectable detractors of “euroskeptic pus” could stoop. The euroskeptics were a “menagerie of has-beens, never-have-beens, and loony tunes.” They were “a sect” of “intellectual violence . . . [stoking] the phobic fire.” They were keen on “Hun-bashing,” yet had something to do with the Latvian SS. They were liars, they were hatemongers. They were a “paradigm of menace and defeat,” “extremist,” “dogmatic,” and “hysterical.” Surely someone somewhere must have said that they were “bitter.” They were “maniacs.” Their opponents were “sane,” a loaded adjective frequently abused in American polemics too.

This dark mood music was deftly conducted by Prime Minister Blair and an entourage skilled in the blackest arts of politics. What was there to lose? An economic illiterate, Blair didn’t grasp how destructive dumping the pound could be, but as an iconoclast he appreciated the break with the past. And campaigning for the euro could bring its own rewards. The Conservatives’ opposition to a change supported by some of the country’s smartest could be used to reinforce the image of the know-nothing Tories, out of touch and not even “sane.” The assault was relentless: Addressing the Labour party conference in 1999, Blair launched into an attack upon the “forces of conservatism,” a faintly totalitarian diatribe that implicitly linked the jailers of Nelson Mandela to the euroskeptic threat. The idea was to push the electorate’s perception of the Tories to a point where the Conservatives would be viewed as oddballs who deserved to be driven out of parliament and, indeed, polite society altogether: Under former Conservative prime minister John Major, explained Blair, “it was weak, weak, weak. Under William Hague, it’s weird, weird, weird. Far right, far out. . . . The more useless they get, the more extreme they get.”

Naturally, a place in the respectability room would be found for those “sane” Conservatives who would sign up for the “cross-party” crusade for the euro. Quite a few did just that.

Polite society paid attention. Conventional wisdom builds upon itself, especially when self-interest is greasing the way. It wasn’t just individuals on the make who discovered their faith in currency union; it was companies too, dancing the corporatist waltz. Obama’s GE would understand. Firmly in the pocket of big business interests confident of their ability to play the EU game, the influential Confederation of British Industry (CBI) threw itself behind the campaign, lending it further credibility and then, less helpfully, incredibility. The CBI’s polling data showed that 84 percent of British business supported the euro. Once this distinctly Soviet result was revealed (thanks to the work of yet another determined euroskeptic “crank”) to have been arrived at by distinctly Soviet math, the pushback slowly began. Within a few years the CBI found itself (in the words of one well-known journalist) “tugged towards the new extremism and europhobia.” In other words, it adopted a neutral stance on the euro.

But don’t see this saga as evidence of some giant conspiracy. There were a few plotters to be sure, notably in the Labour party and, doubtless, Brussels, but for the most part the surge of support for the euro among the U.K.’s chattering classes was the result of something more insidious and less planned: This was a scheme they simply felt to be right. For many British intellectuals, the cultured Europe of their vacations and their imaginations has long been a finer place than their grubby, greedy, and in all senses insular homeland. The weather is nicer, the food is better, and the ambience is both pleasingly picturesque and refreshingly sophisticated. Most alluring of all, Continentals treat the intelligentsia with a respect rarely to be found in unruly, ill-read Blighty.

To such folk, confident in the inadequacies of what they prefer to describe as their midsized nation (then perhaps the fifth-largest economy in the world, with nukes to boot, but let that pass), the EU was a safe haven that only the mad or the bad would disdain. The fact that it had evolved, not into the superpower of Peter Jay’s fears but into the vaguely utopian, proudly progressive post-national technocracy that was Monnet’s greater vision, only added to its appeal. If signing up for the euro was the price of admission to the EU’s inner circle, why would any civilized, “sane” individual want to object? And who knew anyone who had?

There was a lady called Pauline Kael who once asked a question much like that.

In the end, the thin red line held, maintained by politicians of integrity (and, yes, sometimes eccentricity), the caution of British voters, and, crucially, the venom of Gordon Brown, the finance minister, too jealous of the upstart Blair to allow him to take the U.K. into the Eurozone. Britannia stayed out, and has weathered the current economic storms far better than she could have done with the euro around her neck. Signing up for the single currency will be off the agenda for quite a while.

A happy ending then? No, it’s more a “to be continued.” As Weaver and Oborne understand, the opprobrium heaped on the Conservative party for being, as it turned out, right about the euro helped derail the careers of three Tory leaders and paved the way for “modernizers” such as Prime Minister David Cameron, determined to avoid “banging on about Europe” at a time when that’s just what he needs to be doing. The increasingly desperate attempts to resolve the Eurozone crisis are likely to include proposals to change the EU’s legal framework in ways that will require the approval of all member-states. That will be a good moment (if Cameron can be persuaded to seize it) for the U.K. to finally play hardball with its European partners over the repatriation of powers that should never have been transferred to Brussels in the first place. Britain’s euro-claque will noisily object. A reminder to the rest of the country of just how hard that still largely unapologetic claque worked to shove Britain into the Eurozone’s abyss is just what such a debate could use. And that’s what Guilty Men is designed to provide.

Oborne and Weaver give plenty of indications of how much it will be needed. One of the guilty, former EU commissioner Lord Patten, chairs the BBC’s governing body. His vice chairwoman, Diane Coyle, is a lady once deeply concerned about the “gut anti-Europeanism and Little Englandism” of the pound’s “elderly” defenders. This dismal duo will find little in the Beeb’s current EU coverage to disturb them. The Financial Times is now edited by its former Brussels chief, another cheerleader for currency union. He is in charge of a newspaper that appears sadder these days, if not much wiser. Waiting, perhaps, for a fresh euro-dawn, former CBI boss Adair Turner is currently using another collective mania to hobble the British economy. He’s chairman of Britain’s Committee on Climate Change, a perch from which he can admire similar efforts by Britain’s destructively green energy minister, Liberal Democrat Chris Huhne, a europhile who has lost none of his vim. And then there’s Tony Blair, continuing to pontificate to anyone who will pay attention or, at least, pay. He’s not the only member of the Labour party who still believes that Britain should sign up for the single currency—when the time is right, of course.

Zig and zag.

The Euro Endgame

The  Weekly Standard, August 1, 2011

Billion by billion by billion, showdown by argument by ultimatum, Greece’s latest bailout is being put together by those who run the eurozone. The country’s finances are so bad, and its prospects so poor, that even the new $159 billion rescue package announced on Thursday will (assuming it comes into effect) probably only prove to be a reprieve.

Never mind. Buying time is the name of the game. If Greece can be kept going, and Portugal and Ireland too, financial markets might, fingers crossed, calm down, and the threat that panic might engulf Spain and Italy—two economies too big to bail out—and the banks that have lent to them might recede. Then, come July 2013, the $1.1 trillion European Stability Mechanism will spring to life. It will be backed by the 17 members of the eurozone, be policed by Brussels, and it will inherit the proto-IMF powers now being proposed for the European Financial Stability Facility that it will succeed. Well, that is the plan (at the time of writing), complete with a hint of Ponzi, a dash of Micawber, and dire warnings of what the alternative might be.

There’s a lot that needs not to go wrong, but of all the elements that could, the most dangerous may come from a source that Brussels has long tried to write out of the plot: the ballot box. There’s an irony to that. If there was anything (other than misplaced Carolingian nostalgia) at the heart of the project for a European union it was the idea that, after the wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the peoples of the old world could no longer be trusted with their own sovereignty. It’s never been much of an argument, but it’s worked well enough for the EU’s emerging technocratic elite.

The establishment of the euro is thus best understood as just another stage in the progressive disenfranchisement of Europe’s voters. The replacement of domestic currencies with what was, in effect, foreign money meant that, as a practical matter, the countries (and particularly the weaker countries) of the eurozone lost much of what was left of their fiscal and economic autonomy. Previously a nation with subpar finances and/or an uncompetitive cost base could allow the depreciation of its lira, its drachma, or its escudo to restore some balance. Its standard of living might fall relative to its international competitors’, but it could usually muddle along in the fashion that its people had, one way or another, chosen.

Now that option was closed. Forget the voters; once a country could no longer print its own money it had to run itself in ways that ensured it could keep international creditors—which is to say all creditors—happy. More generally, it had to manage itself in a manner that allowed it to keep reasonably close to the pacesetters of the monetary union in which it now dwelt—and if that country was Greece and the pacesetter was Germany, that was only going to be possible (if at all) with wrenching political and cultural change. That change might have been desirable, but to think that external discipline alone would be enough to set it in motion was a fatal conceit.

After 10 years in the currency union, Greece needs to devalue its currency by perhaps 50 percent. With no drachma to debauch, the only alternative is drastic austerity, and that is where politics may spoil the unlovely technocratic party that is now being thrown for the Hellenic Republic. In early July, Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourger who presides over the organizing committee of the eurozone’s finance ministers, announced that Greece’s “economic sovereignty” would be “massively limited.” But what if the Greeks say no?

So far, their parliament has voted through what it has to, but the opposition is not on board, and the economy is being pulled down ever further by debts that cannot be repaid and a currency that Greece cannot afford. With unemployment at an official 16 percent (or 43 percent of those under 24) and further street disturbances a certainty, how long will it be before Greece decides that it has less to lose than its creditors from the “selective” default it is now to be permitted? The crisis has already brought down the Irish and Portuguese governments and contributed to the humiliation of Spain’s ruling Socialists in recent local elections. For all the Brussels chatter of additional “structural funds” to be deployed in the “relaunch” of the Greek economy, how much do Greece’s politicians really have to lose by calling Juncker’s bluff?

Faced with a future that offers, at best, a bleak and humiliating road ahead, their counterparts in other PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) may come to feel the same. Thus the Irish are reexamining the wisdom of guaranteeing the liabilities of their broken banking system to the extent that they have—a promise that, at this stage, may be worth more to foreign creditors than anyone at home.

Those who have found themselves feeding PIIGS are unhappy too, nowhere more so than in Germany, the country that is effectively underwriting the euro, a currency that—true to Brussels form—its electorate was never truly asked to endorse. As for the risks, they were barely discussed with voters, and when they were discussed, they were denied. German taxpayers would not be on the hook for anyone else, oh no. But that’s not how it has turned out for them, and they are not well pleased.

This has put German chancellor Angela Merkel in a spot. Without German support for the eurozone’s crumbling periphery, decidedly unselective defaults will trigger the financial contagion that policymakers are trying to avoid. For all her disapproval of PIIGS sty failings, the pragmatic Merkel understands this perfectly well, but her power to force through another round of assistance is not what it was. She still commands a comfortable majority in the Bundestag, but, in part thanks to the controversy over German participation in earlier bailouts, she has lost her grip over her country’s upper house. There may be worse to come. Polls taken before the announcement of the latest rescue plan showed that over 60 percent of Germans opposed extending further money to Greece, and this discontent is penetrating her governing coalition.

And opposition to bailouts has been mounting amongst voters elsewhere in the eurozone’s richer north for quite some time. That’s ominous. The new Greek package, and the changes to the European Financial Stability Facility that accompany it, require the approval of every member of the coalition of the unwillingthat is meant to be providing the funds. Earlier bailouts have already riled voters in Austria, divided the ruling Dutch coalition, and helped propel the True Finns, a once-small populist party, to third place in April’s Finnish general election with 19 percent of the vote. Under the circumstances the notion that the Greek rescue plan will sail smoothly through all the national parliaments involved looks like fantasy.

The politics will be rough, and they will get rougher. Neither this bailout, nor the expanded European Financial Stability Facility, nor its successor, will be enough to unwind the imbalances now ravaging the eurozone’s periphery. The best chance of achieving that will be to move on to a quasi-federal budgetary, fiscal, and “transfer” union. That will be a hard sell to electorates in those countries that will be footing the bill (probably in excess of an annual $150 billion), and after the fiascos of the last year or so it will be politically too dangerous to try, once again, to bypass them.

Voters may well start to count after all.

Q&A: Stieg Larsson's Ghost Speaks

Bookforum, June  21, 2011

Stockholm, November 2010 © Andrew Stuttaford

STIEG LARSSON: What model Ouija board are we on?

BOOKFORUM: Hasbro.

SL: I like to know the hardware. I always kept my readers informed about the technology Lisbeth was using. Always.

BF: They certainly liked something that you were doing. More than thirty million copies sold. Shocked?

SL: Well, we Swedes try to be modest. Still, read the books carefully. You can see that I liked what I had written. I’d planned ten Salander books in all, you know.

BF: She’d have been your Miss Marple. Some say—how can I put this?—that your death, nearly seven years ago now, boosted sales.

SL: Like Elvis?

BF: Elvis? Well, you both liked junk food, but I was thinking about the freedom that unpleasant event gave international publishers to toy with your text—and to scrap that terrible first title. You must agree that The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo sounds better than Men Who Hate Women.

SL: But there are plenty of men who hate women, no? That’s not fiction, even in that Swedish paradise everyone so likes to talk about, and I wanted to remind my readers of that with a fact or two.

BF: Like the unsourced statistic that “eighteen percent of the women in Sweden have at one time been threatened by a man”? Whatever that vague term threatened may mean . . .

SL: What are you saying?

BF: You’re the investigative journalist. Something doesn’t add up. And the same could be said about some other tales you are said to have spun, about training the Eritrean lady guerrillas, say, or even the one about the gang rape of a “Lisbeth” that allegedly so influenced your development as a feminist. There’s even a book, The Larsson Scandal, that focuses on some of these, uh, inconsistencies.

SL: Jävlar! As you pointed out, I was an investigative journalist myself. I exposed threats, dangerous conspiracies, but this . . .

BF: Let’s return to the pleasanter topic of all those royalties—and, comrade, the contradiction they might represent. You are on the far left, a former Trotskyist, no less.

SL: Well, it was my estate that hit the jackpot, not me. Sure, I hoped to make a bit of money, but all Stieg wanted was a stuga—a cottage—in the country, and maybe to set aside a bit for retirement, the usual. I wasn’t one of those greedy financial types, overpaid for trading bits of paper with their yuppie pals. I created a product that people liked. No one was exploited. Taxes were paid. I have more than done my bit for the welfare state.

BF: And for a lot of other Nordic writers, too. The hunt for the next Stieg Larsson is proving lucrative.

SL: That’s fine. Per Wahlöö and Maj Sjöwall started it all decades ago, not me. They were leftists too, I might add, opposed to the Vietnam War. They made America tremble. Still, I wish that the first Stieg Larsson was still around. Fifty was too young to die.

BF: That’s why you never made a valid will?

SL: Yes, that was a mistake. Swedish intestacy laws hate unmarried partners. Eva deserves more than she’s getting. Then again, the law’s designated legatees, my father and brother, aren’t monsters.

BF: How do you rate the movie versions of your books?

SL: They cut too much of my story, but the girl who played Salander was terrific. As for the Hollywood remake, Mikael Blomkvist, who is, of course, me, will be played by Daniel Craig, James Bond himself. Makes sense, if not to our Mr. Fleming. That snob just laughed when he heard the news. Here he comes now. I’d better go. He can be rough.

BF: Stieg, wait! One more question: Is there really a fourth book, the one they say is on your laptop?

SL: Well, let’s just say if it appears, a ghostwriter will have been involved [laughs, fades].

Greater Europe, Lesser Europe

National Review, June 2, 2011 (June 20, 2011 Issue) 

By the time you read this, Greece may have defaulted on its debt. Or it may be preparing to default, but without the D-word. Most likely it will be negotiating another rescue package, but it may still be fighting to secure the latest payment under its existing bailout. Only one thing looks certain as I write. The eurozone crisis will not be over.

It’s been a long, hard journey since the first Greek bailout just over a year ago, a €110 billion loan package from the European Union (€80 billion) and International Monetary Fund (€30 billion) secured by pledges of drastic austerity. A €750 billion European Financial Stability Facility was announced a little later. The prospect of its billions’ being available to any eurozone country that ran into difficulties was intended to “shock and awe” (yes, that term again) the financial markets into calm.

It did not work out. Both Ireland and Portugal have since had to be bailed out. The destructive contradictions of the one-size-fits-all currency remain unresolved. The damage they caused is unrepaired. Then there’s the fact that the very nature of the eurozone leaves its weaker members vulnerable to fears of default. Most of their debt is in euros, and, for all practical purposes, the euro is a foreign currency. Once investors move out of, say, Irish bonds to safer euro debt elsewhere, all that Ireland can do to lure them back is increase interest rates and tighten its belt yet again. If that doesn’t work, the cash will run out.

Belgian economist Paul de Grauwe argues that a liquidity crunch of this type could force an otherwise solvent country into default. Maybe; but in Greece’s case that’s beside the point. The country has, financially speaking, ceased to be a going concern. Neither the 2010 bailout nor the (partial) introduction of austerity measures that are already at the limit of the politically possible have been enough to do the trick. Indeed, by depressing domestic demand, the latter have — at least in the short term — made the budgetary situation even worse. Tax revenues have been hit by the slump in an economy that shrank by over 4 percent last year, and will likely dwindle by another 3.5 percent this year. The conventional response — a massive devaluation designed to restore international competitiveness — is unavailable so long as Greece remains yoked to the euro.

And it’s not easy to break free. Capital controls would be introduced overnight. The Lazarus drachma would collapse in the morning. Inflation would surge the day after. The country would, de facto or de jure, default on its debt (as would a sizeable slice of its private sector). Greek industry would face a painful funding squeeze. Payrolls would plunge, a brutal blow with the official Greek unemployment rate already at 16 percent or so — and rising.

Beyond Greece’s borders, there would be panic selling of debt issued by some or all of the other PIIGS. With a number of EU banks heavily exposed to the PIIGS, an uncontrolled Greek default, and, more dangerous still, its consequences, could conjure up sweaty memories of the financial crisis. And those affected might include the European Central Bank itself. The ECB has been an active buyer of PIIGS debt. Writing down those holdings could be awkward, especially since the eurozone’s embattled taxpayers would be left holding the tab.

But if Greece’s departure from the euro is too risky to consider, that does not change the fact that the May 2010 financing has not worked. And default would be default whether inside the eurozone or out. It’s all very well criticizing the dodgy process by which Greece was admitted into the currency union, and there are few words ugly enough to describe the squalid state of Greek public finances. Nevertheless, for creditors to insist that the country can cut, privatize, and tax enough quickly enough to stave off disaster is to allow indignation to prevail over financial and political reality. Greece lacks the social cohesion (and shared memory of recent hardship) required to weather the kind of drastic “internal devaluation” that (fingers crossed) took the Baltic countries through their recent debt crises.

According to the EU Commission, Greece’s debt/GDP ratio will rise to 166 percent next year. The annual budget deficit will stand at just under 10 percent of GDP. Under the terms of the May 2010 bailout, that number is supposed to fall to 3 percent by 2014. Dream on. On May 30, Greece’s two-year bonds were yielding over 26 percent. The market’s message was clear. Without substantial additional external financing, default was on the way.

Adding to the concern have been worries that Greece might not satisfy the conditions necessary to allow the IMF (more rule-bound, it is speculated, in the wake of Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s departure) or EU lenders to release their next portions of the original bailout funds. You may know if they have agreed to do so by now, but the best guess must be that these monies will somehow reach Athens, even if it takes a new bailout agreement to get them there. If they don’t, that could, within weeks, trigger the “hard” default that no one wants.

Arranging a fresh bailout will be an unpleasant process, thanks not least to politics. After years of restraint at home, financing the feckless abroad has proved highly unpopular in Germany, the EU’s principal paymaster. The single currency has been a boon for the country’s exporters, but its voters don’t seem to care. They never wanted the euro, and the events of the last twelve months have only reinforced their suspicion that their beloved Deutsche mark was replaced with an extremely expensive dud. Forcing through the earlier support for the PIIGS was a nightmare for Chancellor Merkel. To ask this most cautious of politicians to demand yet more from restless German taxpayers is to ask a great deal. And lender discontent, a useful reminder of how little grassroots appeal EU “solidarity” really enjoys, is not confined to Germany. The Austrians are unhappy, the Dutch government is floundering, and anger in Finland over its participation in eurozone rescue parties has helped propel the populist-nationalist True Finns to the top of the polls. A new bailout will only add fuel to these fires. Merkel, it seems, may be preparing to walk through them. On May 31 markets surged on reports that Germany had dropped its insistence that any new bailout should be conditional on bondholders’ sharing in the taxpayers’ pain.

But despite, doubtless, additional austerity measures and fierce mechanisms to enforce them, new rescue packages will do little to solve the underlying structural problem in Greece and, for that matter, elsewhere. They may buy time but, in the end, there is simply too much debt for some PIIGS to repay. If an honest, old-fashioned default is too terrible to contemplate, that leaves three routes to a theoretically more permanent solution.

The first is, basically, what Merkel wants, “restructuring,” a default in sheep’s clothing, albeit one timed later than she would like. This would be designed in a way that allows banks to dodge the write-downs that could bring them low. The ECB is fiercely opposed to this approach, arguing that it will inevitably set off a fresh wave of financial contagion, even a new Lehman. Nouriel Roubini, Doctor Doom himself, disagrees. It is impossible to say who is right. Both sides are, in the end, making guesses about the mood of a perpetually manic marketplace. That said, the ECB’s stance implies the PIIGS will eventually be able to repay all their debt: an idea as implausible as the notion that they might fly.

More probably, the ECB is relying on Brussels to push forward with the closer fiscal and economic union without which no large monetary union can succeed. This has always been on the European Commission’s agenda, but until this thoroughly predictable and most convenient crisis, it had been politically impossible. That’s changing. Fiscal and economic integration has gone farther and faster over the last 18 months than would have been imaginable just a few years ago. The Eurocracy may, despite current traumas, even see this all as a vindication of the great gamble that was taken when the euro was launched half-done. The problem for Brussels is that the events of the last year have left voters in the eurozone core free from any illusion as to how costly such deeper integration — which would essentially establish a permanent funds-transfer regime from north to south — would be. Will they go along? Will they even be asked?

The third, and, I’d argue, best alternative for now — the split of the euro into two, a strong “core” euro and a weaker euro for the PIIGS — is not without its difficulties, but it ought to work. It would give the PIIGS both the devaluation they need and a chance of avoiding default, and, in addition, it should trim some of the “excess” German surplus. This may be the best alternative, but it’s also the least likely. To Brussels such a velvet divorce would represent an unacceptable step back, and that would never do.

Estonia’s anti-euro campaigners compare the single currency to the Titanic. It’s easy to see why.

PIIGS to the Slaughter

National Review, December 2, 2010 (December 20, 2010 issue) 

Checking into a roach motel often seems like a straightforward decision.

Signing up for the euro, the shiny new currency supposedly saturated in German fiscal rectitude, not only pleased Ireland’s paymasters in Brussels (the country has benefited hugely from lavish dollops of EU “structural” assistance) but offered Dublin the prospect of riches far closer to hand than the end of the traditional rainbow. The combination of EU aid (amounting in some years to as much as 3 percent of GDP), domestic frugality, shrewd supply-side reforms, and (those were the days) a timely currency devaluation had already given birth to a Celtic Tiger nourished on export-led success. But that beast was now set to burn very bright indeed.

And so it did. Money poured in, bringing the traditional speculative excess in its wake. So far, so normal: Usually such festivities are brought to a more or less timely close by both external and internal pressure. Inflation heats up, the currency buckles, interest rates rise, fiscal policy is tightened, bank lending is reined in, and everyone is soon back on their best behavior — until the next time.

Joining the euro meant that much of this script was jettisoned. Market signals were muffled by membership in a unified monetary system in which one size truly did not fit all. In particular, Irish interest rates, determined primarily by the needs of the eurozone’s sluggish Franco-German core, were kept far too low (on average, they were negative in real terms between 1998 and 2007) for a roaring economy growing at an annual average rate of 6 percent between 1988 and 2007. Throw in a poorly regulated banking system, endemic cronyism, vast infusions of foreign cash (euro membership had dramatically reduced currency risk), a lending war led by the remarkably reckless Anglo Irish Bank, the genuine housing needs of a large new immigrant population (a striking phenomenon in this land once known for its emigrants), and briskly increasing wage rates, and the stage was set for a gigantic property boom. What could go wrong?

Just about everything; and it went so badly that (finally) doing the right thing may have made matters even worse. When the global financial crisis erupted and the Irish economy slumped (GDP fell by 7.1 percent in 2009 after a 2 percent decline the previous year), real-estate prices fell (they are now some 35 percent below their peak, and weaker still in Dublin), and the banks came down with them. The government’s response bore some resemblance to the approach taken so successfully by Sweden during a not-entirely-dissimilar banking crisis in the early 1990s. This included guaranteeing most of the liabilities of the country’s troubled banks (and troubled they were — by 2007, property-related lending accounted for some 60 percent of their loan books) and transferring toxic assets to NAMA, the National Asset Management Agency, a state-run “bad bank.”

But Ireland’s banking sector was far larger relative to its GDP than Sweden’s had been, and so was its real-estate bubble. The Irish government has also had to contend with a far less favorable economic climate, a difference made even more damaging by the fact that the Irish tax system is unusually sensitive to changes in economic activity. Tax revenues fell by almost 14 percent in 2008 and by 19 percent in 2009, bringing yet more misery to the republic’s previously respectable but swiftly deteriorating public finances.

Recovery from a mess like this is never plain sailing, but one way to lessen the pain is to arrange a currency devaluation (Sweden let the krona fall by 20 percent in late 1992) to give exporters a break. Unfortunately, membership in the eurozone had closed off that option. Ireland was thus stuck with an overpriced currency, an overpriced workforce, and a rapidly growing hard-money debt burden that could not be inflated away. All that was left was “internal devaluation.” That’s an ugly name for an ugly cure generally revolving around extraordinarily brutal public-sector austerity. The aim is to restore both the state’s finances and the nation’s international competitiveness, and it’s just what Ireland had been attempting since 2008 with a series of increasingly bleak budgets intended to reduce the deficit by over $19 billion.

Internal devaluation is a bitter pill to swallow even when it works, but when it doesn’t . . .

And in Ireland it may well not. As it has lurched its way through 2010, the government has fed ever more money into the country’s devastated banks (most notably the now-reviled Anglo Irish Bank), effectively canceling out the savings being generated by the austerity program and pushing the estimated 2010 public-sector deficit to some 32 percent of GDP (it would otherwise have been around 12 percent). This renewed the market’s worries about Ireland and, ominously, other fiscally fragile eurozone members. Exacerbating the rising tension, the European Central Bank appeared to be continuing with its effort to scale back the short-term support it had been extending to the eurozone’s financial institutions — support that was widely assumed to be vital to many banks in most or all of the notorious PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain). Perceptions of sovereign and banking risk were converging, not unreasonably so given the way that governments were standing (either explicitly or implicitly) behind their countries’ banks. To take one example, when Fitch cut Ireland’s rating from AA- to A+ this fall, it specifically cited the mounting cost of the bank clean-up.

All this made October a terrible month for German chancellor Angela Merkel to demand that the European Stability Mechanism, which is scheduled to replace the current European Financial Stability Facility in 2013, include a provision requiring private holders of government debt to share in the pain of future sovereign bailouts. The provision is common sense. To call for it at a time of jagged nerves over European sovereign risk was not. Merkel’s comments related only to arrangements that might be put in place in the future, but given her frequent tirades against “speculators” and Germany’s key role in funding any bailouts to come, many in the financial markets worried that they might herald an attempt to change the ground rules well before 2013 — and not in a way that would be in the interests of bondholders. Yields on PIIGS bonds rose, while money continued to drift away from Ireland’s banks, and investors from its debt. Theoretically, the country still had enough money to meet its financing needs until mid-2011, but, if panic was to be headed off (at least temporarily), its government had to be persuaded to accept the bailout that it was desperately claiming not to need.

The risk posed by spreading financial contagion was simply too high, and not just for Ireland. The European Financial Stability Facility, which was created for the eurozone with such fanfare (there was talk of shock and awe) at the time of the Greek bailout, is not large enough to rescue Ireland and Portugal and Spain, the next two countries most likely to be hit should confidence fall any farther. Dublin caved. An outline rescue package was announced on November 21. The full details were released a week later. The total package will amount to $110 billion, including an immediate $13 billion injection of fresh capital into the banking system. In an unanticipated development, Ireland will chip in $23 billion from its pension reserve fund and various other pots of money. The balance is set to come from the International Monetary Fund, from the European Financial Stability Facility, and from three non-eurozone countries, the U.K., Sweden, and Denmark. The whole thing is conditional on the passing of yet another Irish austerity budget, one that contains an additional $20 billion in tax increases and spending cuts. These cuts, when added to the earlier bouts of slash-and-burn, amount to roughly 20 percent of GDP.

At the same time, more details were given of the planned new European Stability Mechanism, but — not insignificantly — with (some) dilution of Angela Merkel’s proposal for sharing the burden of future bailouts. It was also agreed that Greece should be given an extra four-and-a-half years to repay its emergency financing from earlier this year. Ireland, however, will no longer be obliged to contribute to Greece’s bailout. On a brighter note, and over the objections of some in the rescue party, Ireland was allowed to retain the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate that has served it so well.

The republic’s governing coalition, a dying partnership between the centrist Fianna Fail and the Greens, has to pass the new austerity budget within a few days with a parliamentary majority of only two and without much popular support. In a clear warning sign for the general election now set for January, Fianna Fail received a November 25 by-election shellacking from Sinn Fein, a party frequently described as the political wing of the IRA. The EU’s mandarins like to claim that their “ever closer” union is burying Europe’s old nationalisms. That’s not how it looked in Donegal South West that weekend.

Despite this, Ireland’s mainstream parties recognize that the deficit needs to be reduced soon — even if they disagree on the specifics of the rescue package. At the time of writing, things are very fluid, but the best guess is that the budget will probably squeak through, albeit with a great deal of shouting. If it doesn’t, there’s a clear risk that financial chaos will soon engulf some or all of the PIIGS, and, no less dangerously, the banks that have lent so much to them. Even if it does go through, don’t expect too much. The distinctly downbeat market reaction to both the initial announcement of an Irish bailout (yields on the PIIGS’ government debt rose; the euro fell) and its later confirmation reveals a widespread belief that this rescue is not the end of the story.

It’s not. More bailouts undoubtedly lie ahead, and, in the case of Greece and Ireland, so does a debt restructuring (that’s the polite word for default) at some moment when it is judged that the financial markets can cope with the news. So long as these countries are yoked to the euro, there is no feasible alternative. Their domestic demand will be crippled by the processes of internal devaluation. Their export sectors will be hobbled by a hard currency. Under the circumstances, they will struggle to grow their economies at a pace fast enough to reduce their debt burdens to manageable levels. There are good reasons the yield on their debt continues to rise.

Meanwhile, Brussels, apparently unshaken in its belief that one size can be made to fit all, will try to impose unified fiscal and budgetary rules across the eurozone. If this succeeds, it may reassure restless German voters that there are credible limits on the amount they will be asked to pay to support European monetary union. That the implementation of such zonal discipline will, if carried through, also deepen European integration is even more to the Eurocrats’ point. That it would doom a large swath of the continent to years of subpar growth is just too bad. The European project must move forward!

Splitting the single currency into a “northern” euro for Germany and those of its neighbors that want to come along and a “southern” euro for the rest is one more congenial, if risky, alternative route to take. It would retain important elements of the status quo while paving the way for the devaluations that the PIIGS so badly need. But to take this path would be an admission of defeat too humiliating for the EU’s leadership to accept, at least for now. And if that’s off the agenda, so, even more so, is a return by the nations of the eurozone to their old currencies.

The final alternative, for an Ireland or a Greece to exit the euro on its own, would involve national bankruptcy, the collapse of much of the domestic private sector, and Lehman Part Deux. 

It’s not always easy to check out of a roach motel.