The Trouble With Harry

G.P. Taylor: Shadowmancer; Wormwood

National Review, December 30, 2004

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FOR those of us who like to believe, however tentatively, in human progress, the notion that there are 21st-century Americans who think that the brave, benign—and fictional—Harry Potter can be used as a recruitment officer for the occult is profoundly depressing. And yet there are surprisingly many who fear just that. For year after year now, different school districts across the country have faced complaints whenever the hero of Hogwarts rides his Nimbus 2000 broomstick onto the curriculum or into the library. But the Lord, or the market, works in mysterious ways and those so harried by the thought of Harry have recently found, well, a savior in the shape of a former policeman and roadie for the Sex Pistols, the Reverend G. P. Taylor, the vicar of Cloughton, a small town in the north of England. He’s the author of two bestselling children’s books (both, like Harry Potter, with a surprisingly strong crossover readership among adults), Shadowmancer and Wormwood, novels of deviltry, danger, and intrigue where the ultimate hero is neither wizard nor witch, but God.

Funnily enough, it was that disreputable Master Potter who prompted the parson to pick up his pen. As Taylor explained in an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network, he lectures on the occult and the New Age and, during the course of one talk, he was discussing “the dangers of Harry Potter and all that sort of stuff.” At the end of the evening, a woman suggested that he write a book. It was a sign! Within nine months, Taylor had completed Shadowmancer, and after the now-traditional round of rejections (ask Harry Potter’s creator, J. K. Rowling), he published it himself, selling his motorcycle to provide the necessary cash. Word-of-mouth did the rest.

Subsequently, Faber & Faber, a major U.K. publisher, bought the rights to Taylor’s epic, and the rest is history. Shadowmancer spent 15 weeks at the top of the British book charts, and its successor, Wormwood, was also a hit. A Shadowmancer movie is planned and multi-book contracts have been signed on both sides of the Atlantic (the reverend’s writings have also found a large audience in America).

It’s a great story: Taylor’s success makes for an inspirational and possibly miraculous tale. Miraculous? Well, how else to explain that books quite so bad have sold quite so well? Linked chapters in a saga that is (Lord, help us) planned to stretch over many more volumes, Shadowmancer and Wormwood are both set in (to give Taylor his due) a vividly described 18th-century England, a place of squalor, poverty, and oppression, far more Gin Lane than Beer Street. They are an account of two rounds in the eternal battle between the Creator (here called Riathamus, a Latin form of an ancient British word meaning “king of kings”) and You Know Who. The first revolves around the struggle for a sacred relic and—the Reverend Taylor’s psychiatrist can make of this what he will—a wicked vicar’s lust for world domination; the second deals with the coming of a comet that may be the deeply unpleasant “Wormwood” prophesied in one of the Book of Revelation’s gloomier passages.

With such a dramatic background, it’s remarkable that Taylor’s books fail to enthrall; yet somehow they do. The plotting is all over the place, much of the writing is clunky (Iron Maiden meets the Sermon on the Mount) and the ill-defined, but vast, cast of characters and creatures that flit in and out of the narrative will bewilder many of the books’ younger readers—and, trust me, some of the older ones too. Thulak? Seloth? Dunamez? Diakka? Varrigal? Glashan? Life’s too short as it is.

But do Shadowmancer and Wormwood even succeed in fulfilling the spiritual task that Taylor, a devout and obviously sincere man, has set out for them? From these books and numerous interviews that he has given, it’s fairly clear that Taylor wanted to show that the fight against evil must be seen as religious (if not, claims Taylor, necessarily Christian, although his work is filled with Christian imagery). He also set out to deliver the clear message that the occult is far from being a harmless parlor game. It’s no surprise that it’s an angel, not a wizard, who is on hand to help Taylor’s heroes in their adventures, and magic, oh dear, that’s a no-no.

We see this in the middle of one dramatic scene, when Raphah, the young Ethiopian (in a nod to the pieties of multiculturalism, Taylor has boasted that he got “sick of little Harry Potter being a nice little white Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) who is one of the heroes of Shadowmancer, angrily confronts a woman and her faith in the Tarot:

“Do you really believe in the power of those picture cards? There is a far greater law than the one that controls the roll of the dice or the turn of a card . . . each one of you is taken in by what you hear. You’re quick to believe in spirits when it’s really someone banging on the side of the bed. None of you will turn to the one who can truly set you free.”

Fine, but this blunt lecture is a long way from, say, the subtler allegory that is C. S. Lewis’s Narnia, stories written by a man whose Christianity was no less muscular than that of the Reverend Taylor. Other than for those who are already cheering from their pews, the way Taylor punctuates his narrative with sermonettes and preachy nuggets is likely to be more annoying than convincing. In this respect, ironically, he is reminiscent of another best-selling British children’s writer, the gifted but irritating Philip Pullman, whose initially promising His Dark Materials trilogy ultimately dissolved into a dreary atheist rant.

That Taylor dislikes the occult, there’s no doubt. Unfortunately, he sees it not as it is, a conjuring-trick creed of cretins and the credulous, but as something that is genuinely powerful—all too real, and all too dangerous. He’s on the record as believing in ghosts (one of his houses was, he has said, haunted) and has presided over a few exorcisms in his time; earlier, in his wild, and somewhat regretted, youth, he experimented with tarot cards, séances, and Ouija boards.

These beliefs, when linked with Taylor’s violent, lurid, Heavy Metal aesthetic (this vicar puts the Goth in Golgotha), mean that his writing may invest the dark side, even if it always ultimately loses, with rather more seductive force than he may have intended. Here is how the angel Abram describes Hezrin, one of Wormwood’s more sinister demons:

“She is a collector of angels and any other trinket that takes her fancy. I have known her for an eternity, century to century, Paris and Rome, Constantinople and Babylon. The thing with [her] is that she never changes, always those same deep, beautiful eyes that capture the soul—and hands that will tear out your heart.”

Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Narnia anymore.

What's So Fascinating About Office Politics?

In Good Company

The New York Sun, December, 29, 2004

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In Soviet movies in Stalin's day, peasants sang and factories hummed. In America, by contrast, a country where the economic system has actually delivered the goods, Hollywood's hymns to the glories of office or factory are, with occasional exceptions, either off-key or nonexistent. Just as "Tucker - The Man and His Dream," possibly the finest movie ever made on the American auto industry, was about failure, so films about the American workplace tend to be dyspeptic, depressing, and filled with resentment: Chaplin's "Modern Times" is a parable of alienation, Billy Wilder's "Apartment" becomes a sty for management swine, and no salesman can watch David Mamet's "Glengarry Glen Ross" without drink in hand or razor blade on wrist. As for "The Man in a Gray Flannel Suit" - well, you get the picture.

In fact, with the dubious exception of those creepily contented employees in the current Wal-Mart commercials, the happiest laborers ever seen on American screens are those seven little fellows who used to whistle while they worked. Cartoon characters. Foreigners, Germans, as I recall.

None of this should be a surprise. Artistic types have never been too fond of capitalism, and they like turning up for a regular job even less. That said, the most striking aspect of movies about the workplace is not their content, but their rarity. Millions toil five days a week, but you wouldn't know it from the fare at the local multiplex. Exotic locations (Outer space! Ancient Rome! High school!) are used again and again, but films about the office are more difficult to find than laughs in a Chevy Chase comedy. The office isn't box office.

Some movies even may take place in the office, but they are not about the office. Law office and newsroom are movie perennials - "In Good Company" is a variation on the latter - but the 1980s, like the 1950s, generated movies set in the world of big business. "Working Girl," while hardly a careful exposition of the investment banking profession, was (like the equally fluffy "The Secret of My Success" ) a cheery reflection of the pro-business, can-do spirit of America under Reagan - a president whose greatest movie role, it should be remembered, was in the remarkable "King's Row," where he played a man who lost his legs but found happiness in real estate.

"Wall Street," meanwhile, was not about, well, Wall Street so much as it was a tale of the temptation, fall, and redemption of one man, a variant on a fable that has been around ever since that unhappy day in Eden; indeed, it is repeated in the Clinton-era "Boiler Room," a tale of the temptation, fall, and redemption of, yes, yet another young stockbroker.

But it was always going to be difficult for cinema to capture the essence of employment, which is its repetitiveness, the daily grind repeated year after year after year. Except, perhaps, in the more arid areas of the avant-garde, feature films need a story, a hero, and a clear narrative arc. Office life is not like that.

The most successful workplace film in recent years, "Office Space" - "Dilbert" on 35 mm - played corporate angst for laughs. Without the filter of humor, its tale of despair, cynicism, incompetence, and ennui would have been impossible to watch - at least by anyone with a cubicle to report to. "In Good Company," starring Dennis Quaid, Topher Grace, and Scarlett Johansson and opening today, has more than a little in common with "Office Space."

Both are portrayals of the way in which modern corporations cloak age-old greed in new age sentiment and meaningless business school procedures - with the implicit message that this is typical of much of American capitalism. The difference, reflecting another half-decade of restructuring, globalization, and general white-collar mayhem, is that "Office Space" describes a company that was already dysfunctional, while "In Good Company" relates the history of a decent corporate culture overwhelmed by the demands of Globecom, its appalling - and unsubtly named - new owner.

The film is mostly enjoyable, though its tacked-on happy ending leaves something to be desired. But the need for such unrealistic interpolations, it seems to me, is one of the reasons office life has always been most effectively portrayed in television series - and, again, often as comedy. By allowing the viewer to return to the same location and the same characters week after week, a series generates a sense of routine (very) roughly analogous to showing up to work.

Unconfined by the constraints of the Hollywood hundred minutes, television's format allows for greater detail, slower plot development, and a depiction of more complex relationships than the Sturm und Drang of the silver-screen workplace. A researcher trying to get a sense of how young investment bankers spent their time in the 1980s would do far better to watch "Capital City," a British financial soap from that era, than return to the study, yet again, of Gordon Gekko's fortune cookie aphorisms.

Under the circumstances, it is no surprise that it is a television series, the BBC's "The Office" (you can catch it on BBC America, or on DVD) that is perhaps the finest depiction of the hopelessness of corporate life. Once again it's comedy, a brilliant, brutally observed, brutally funny "Spinal Tap"-style mockumentary about a dreary office, a drearier workforce and a boss so lost in ego and management babble that you wouldn't wish him on Donald Trump.

Appropriately enough, the series ended on a note so bleak that, by comparison, a suicide note would read like a script for "Friends." The show's creators later relented, producing a "special" episode that provided something approaching a happy ending. Wimps.

Why To See It

The destructive takeover of a nice local business by a rapacious outsider has been a staple of American cinema for years, long, long before the onslaught of Globecom, Larry the Liquidator ("Other People's Money"), and long, doubtless, before that dismaying crisis at George Bailey's shambles of a building and loan (you know what movie I'm talking about). What makes this film worth watching are three performances.

There's Dennis Quaid in the cliched, but still effective role of Dan Foreman, the veteran manager forced to compromise his principles to stay in a job that has become a penance, the reliably sinister Malcolm McDowell as "Teddy K," the charismatic boss of Globecom, cheered and feared by the employees he will inevitably "let go," and Topher Grace as the jargon-spouting young manager, in charge, but out of depth, brought in to boss Foreman around.

Like Peter Gibbons, the hero of "Office Space," Mr. Grace's character, Carter Duryea, comes to understand that he is an apparatchik trapped in a system in which he no longer believes. I don't want to tell how the movie resolves his dilemma, but like Gibbons, and like Melville's proto-slacker Bartleby before him, it becomes clear Duryea may simply decide that he prefers not to continue working for Teddy K or, for that matter, in any other office. He's left with a choice: wicked big business or free-spirited "authenticity."

I think you can guess what he decides to do.

Dead Zone

National Review Online, December 8, 2004

Lily Dale, September, 2004 © Andrew Stuttaford

Lily Dale, September, 2004 © Andrew Stuttaford

If the painter Thomas Kinkade has redesigned Heaven—and who’s to say that he hasn’t?—it might look a little like Lily Dale, a tiny community about an hour south of Buffalo. On a gentle-breeze, blue-sky, no-cares, endless-summer sort of day, gingerbread Victorian cottages doze alongside tranquil, flag-festooned streets. The houses’ colors—white, yellow, gray—are, like their inhabitants, mainly muted, gentle by design or faded by the years. Only occasional flashes of eccentricity—an unexpected plague of stone angels here, a rash of concrete cherubs there—signal to visitors that there’s something not quite right, not Shyamalan wrong, but odd nonetheless, about this idyllic village nestled so prettily against a quiet lake.

Even Lily Dale’s visitors (those that are visible anyway—I’ll explain that remark later) seem more subdued than the typical vacationing hordes, more Trappist than tourist, chatting among themselves in low tones as they stroll towards their destinations. Once—over a century ago—there was a Ferris wheel here, a bowling alley, dances, even (oh, the thrill!) speeches by Susan B. Anthony, but those excitements have passed, vanished into history and stiff sepia images. But guests can still wander under the shade of trees more than a hundred years old now, and, if they choose, across a series of small, perfectly kept parks—immaculately green as they sweep down in the direction of the lake, itself smooth, untroubled, and inviting, gently lapping up against the eastern edge of town.

And the sense that there’s something celestial about this place is only reinforced by a small white-pillared “Forest Temple” half-hidden amid some trees and by the “Healing Temple” that can be found nearby (yes, yes, I was “healed,” blue light discovered burning within me, long story). Bells toll at certain times of day summoning the faithful to meditation, ritual, and to quavering old tunes played on a quavering old organ, the singing of quavering old hymns of spirit messages and eternal light.

These people are, quite clearly, not Baptists.

To find out more, enter the cool, dark Leolyn Woods. Like so much in Lily Dale, they are unexpected survivors, a rare scrap of old-growth forest. Walk straight ahead. Don’t be tempted by the questionable attractions of the pet cemetery. Look instead for an ancient tree stump—Inspiration Stump, they call it here—and the people gathered there to hear from the hereafter. They have turned up for the daily “message service,” a séance, stand-up style, at the stump, starring the quick (a rapid succession of mediums) and the dead (a host of the dear departed—dads, moms, a brother or two).

If you’re ex, Lily Dale is in.

People have been bothering the dead in Lily Dale since 1879. That was the year in which a handful of pioneers, enthusiastic participants in the great wave of spookery and table tapping that gripped those supposedly sensible Victorians, first bought property here. It was to be a permanent site (only Spiritualists can own property in “the Dale,” even today) for enlightenment, and communication with corpses—a “White Acre,” wrote Mrs. Abby Louise Pettengill (its 1903 president), “where all may receive the benediction of the unseen world.”

She would have been pleased to see (and perhaps she did, who knows?) the small but expectant crowd waiting one Friday evening in Lily Dale’s Assembly Hall for a benediction from another world, in their case a chinwag with ET. Like Spiritualism before it, much UFO mythology is an attempt to reconcile mystical and superstitious impulses with the unwelcome realities of an age of science. And like Spiritualism it soon descends into mush-mutterings of otherworldly visitors, enlightened beings, and contact with the mysterious, thrilling unknown, talk which the late (or not) Mrs. Pettengill would surely have relished.

And when it comes to enlightened beings, there’s no better guide than the human speaker that night, writer and soulapath (don’t ask) Lisette Larkins. She’s the author of Listening to Extraterrestrials: Telepathic Coaching by Enlightened Beings; Talking to Extraterrestrials: Communicating with Enlightened Beings; and, alarmingly for those of us familiar with the work of Fox Mulder, Calling on Extraterrestrials: 11 Steps to Inviting Your Own UFO Encounters. After an hour or so of New Age banality and musical interludes that would have insulted Yanni, an alien turns up, but, dismayingly, via Ms. Larkins rather than in person. Repeatedly shaking her head from side to side, alien Lisette starts speaking in a slow, faintly mechanical voice slightly reminiscent of Hillary Rodham Clinton. She is purportedly channeling messages from our extraterrestrial visitor, but the vague beatitudes and something about “connecting” reveal only that this particular alien is from Planet Hallmark. That’s not worth the price of admission. For 30 bucks I expect Klaatu barada nikto or, at least, sexy Sil from Species.

Where flying saucers hover, other nonsense is never far behind. Sure enough, the Crystal Cove, Lily Dale’s gift shop, is a supermarket of superstitions, a casbah for the credulous, its pick-’n’-mix spirituality a perfect symbol of the intellectual confusions of our age. It’s all there: the supernatural bric-a-brac (Celtic crosses, misting bowls, chalices, spell books, fortune-telling kits, candles, Ouija boards, strange hanging things); the tarot (tarot of love, fairy-tale tarot, universal Waite tarot, basic tarot, spiral tarot, Lord of the Rings tarot, unicorn tarot, dragon tarot, tarot of the Sephirot, herbal tarot, renaissance tarot, quest tarot, tarot of a moon garden, Morgan-Greer tarot); cosmic kitsch (fairies, angels, fairies, unicorns, fairies, various goddesses, fairies, the goddess, yet more fairies, wizards); and the inevitable Native Americana, complete, naturally, with Native American tarot.

Despite that very contemporary willingness to accept any reassuring mumbo-jumbo, however ludicrous, so long as it can be wrapped in vaguely mystical garb, in its core Lily Dale clings to the traditions of its slightly off, determined founders, those earnest Victorians convinced that table-tapping, séances, and other conjuring tricks could give them what generations had dreamed of: proof, scientific proof, that we all enjoy an encore in a place some called Summerland. According to Spiritualism, nobody dies. We “pass,” we don’t die. There is no death, only a “transition.” Nevertheless, for a faith that revolves around eternal life, Spiritualism has always had a rather morbid fixation with that dicey moment that, as a pessimist, I still call, well, death. In all its prettiness, there’s a touch of the funeral parlor about Lily Dale, something a little oppressive, something too hushed, too over-scented, too much.

In a way this is inevitable. It’s death that brings the living to Lily Dale. Offer the grief-stricken and the lonely the chance, any chance, to talk to those that they have lost, and some will try their luck. And where there are the desperate, there will be those who take advantage of them. You can see their traces in Lily Dale’s museum, most strikingly in a collection of relics from the Gilded Age, a golden age, quite clearly, of bunkum. There are the slates on which the spirits allegedly scrawled their enigmatic messages, the spirit trumpets that floated through the air, even the peculiar, strangely compelling paintings that supposedly materialized onto canvas untouched by (living) human hand, paintings of the passed, paintings of spirit guides, even, helpfully, a painting of the spirit world to come. It looks, yes, a little like something Thomas Kinkade might have done, but since its artist was dead at the time, it’s churlish to carp.

In our scientific age, our time of reason and progress, our era of Kabbalah, crystals, alien abductions, Wicca, homeopathy, goddess worship, Al Gore, past-life regression, astral travel, psychic hotlines, recovered memories, Feng Shui, and creation “science,” all that old sideshow spiritualism seems somehow something of a relic, too crass, too embarrassing, too crude for an epoch so spiritually sophisticated that Madonna is a major religious figure. The trumpets have been stilled: “physical mediumship” is rarely practiced in Lily Dale these days, but the hunger that nourished it still remains.

You can see it—neurotic, compulsive, relentless, and not a little sad—in the capacity crowd packed into the Dale’s auditorium to listen to the medium James van Praagh “Making The Psychic Connection” between, ambitiously, “Heaven and Earth.” We’ve each paid $80 to hear him.

That’s more than twice the price of an extraterrestrial, but, in the dim galaxy of contemporary superstition, James Van Praagh is a star. Like Amy Fisher and Adolf Hitler, he too has been the subject of a TV miniseries (played by Ted Danson!), a cultural accolade matched only by his multiple appearances on Larry King Live. He’s a best-selling author and recording artist and a man who, judging by his website, survived a childhood that combined the worst of Jeffrey Dahmer (“an average child, he remembers having a tremendous fascination with death”) with the best of Joan of Arc (“an open hand appeared through the ceiling…emitting radiant beams of light”). Despite a weakness for the saccharine (“When a bright smile overcomes tears, it becomes a smile that can light up the world”), Van Praagh is also highly entertaining. He’s John Edward with good jokes, a Frank Cannon moustache, and a way with the ladies who make up the bulk of his beguiled and besotted audience.

Some are there just to gawp at the dead men talking (many spirits, yikes, are “here with us today”), while others have come to be soothed by Van Praagh’s soft-soap sermons. “Death” is painless, everybody’s immortal, and we all end up in Heaven. “Step into that world,” he purrs, “there’s no judgment.” It’s a perfect gospel for a society in full flight from the notion that we should ever have to account for our actions. Some spectators, sadder, unhinged, pleading, are there for the answers, and the comfort, that reality cannot provide. Sharon has survived “a couple of terminal illnesses” but is not satisfied with the advice of her doctors (she’s led away to speak to a “medical intuitive”), while others, weeping, choking up, voices cracking, tell of sick friends, of children killed in motorcycle accidents, of relatives lost to cancer, and the rest of the carnage we call daily life.

These are people who want to believe. When Van Praagh starts tossing out ambiguous communiqués from beyond, it doesn’t take long before someone can be found who thinks that these messages might be for her. Another quick succession of references, names, and clues follow, all seemingly precise, but in reality vague enough to allow the respondent to find something in it for herself and, in replying, give Van Praagh further, invaluable guidance for his next step, and, ultimately, “validation”: the supposedly specific factoid needed to prove that long-dead dad is indeed with us that day. It looks to me a lot like an old technique known as “cold reading.” All it takes is a quick mind, intuition, and (no problem here) an audience that has lost connection with reality.

Still, Van Praagh manages, there’s no denying, some remarkable hits: coincidence, or, perhaps, well…

Whatever the explanation, none of my dead relatives shows up. Much as I would like it to, this proves nothing. They were a reserved lot and none of them would have been seen dead in a place like the auditorium. With the thought that somewhere more discreet might be more inviting, I decide on an individual consultation with one of the many mediums that have set up shop in Lily Dale. She’s a kindly soul, a late middle-aged woman with twinkling eyes, a jolly smile, and 40 of my dollars. Within a few minutes, and, shall we say, some gentle prompting on my part, she has proof that both (a twofer!) my grandmothers are with us in the room. As they’ve been dead for nearly 30 years, that’s quite a family get-together, like a childhood Christmas back in England, even if I can’t actually see the guests.

And if I believe that, I’m the Christmas turkey.

Stumbling Down the Road to Hell

Ian Kershaw: Making Friends with Hitler

The New York Sun, December 2, 2004

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Ian Kershaw is best known for "Hitler," his two-volume, definitive account of one of history's monsters. His new book, by contrast, deals with an irritating British nobleman who was at best a footnote, at worst a nonentity. In telling the strange, sad story of the lord who tried to befriend a fuhrer, Mr. Kershaw highlights the English ineptitude that was to prove so helpful to the German dictator throughout the 1930s. "Making Friends With Hitler" (The Penguin Press, 488 pages, $29.95) also comes with a disturbing contemporary resonance. In part it's a tale of people living in the comfort of Western democracy, but all too ready to excuse totalitarian savagery overseas in the interest of their own ideological obsessions. Those people still exist: Chomsky, Sarandon, Moore, take your pick.

The exhaustingly, and slightly repetitively, named Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-Stewart, the 7th Marquess of Londonderry, was born into immense wealth and an even larger sense of entitlement. He was also born too late. By the time he became a member of Parliament, the old aristocratic order was beginning to crumble, and by the time he returned home from the trenches of the World War I, Britain was only a few years from its first Labour government.

Oblivious or uncaring, this self-important but not very talented aristocrat still felt high office was his right. The viceroyalty of India eluded his grasp, but in the end perseverance, connections, and aggressive entertaining produced their reward: In effect, Londonderry catered his way into the Cabinet, becoming Britain's Air Minister in 1931. As was said, a touch acidly, about one of his earlier, equally dubious, promotions, it was not possible to "use a man's hospitality and not give him a job."

Maybe, but the early 1930s were not the best time to put a mediocrity into such a role. As minister in charge of the air force he had somehow to reconcile Britain's security requirements with increasingly assertive demands from Germany for strategic parity. All this at a time when most Britons were still calling for disarmament and the exchequer was short of spare cash.

It was a task for which Londonderry was neither intellectually nor temperamentally equipped. As Mr. Kershaw explains, "having imbibed the aristocratic values of Victorian and Edwardian England" he was "totally unprepared for the rough, tough, world of the 1930s ... where the mailed fist and political thuggery were what counted."

But if he was unprepared, so was his country, and that parallel, I suspect, was Mr. Kershaw's point in choosing to make this minor figure the focus of such a major study. Mr. Kershaw treats Londonderry as a symbol of the failures of Britain's governing class; the story of his undeserved rise and precipitate fall is used to tell the wider tale of his country's disastrous failure to head off Hitler.

The problem is that Londonderry was not a particularly representative figure. While his story (which Mr. Kershaw, as one would expect, tells well) is of interest, it is as a curiosity more than anything else - "Believe It or Not" rather than "The Gathering Storm." This is a book for readers who enjoy the byways and the detours of history, and the tales of those who can be found there.

Those wanting a general account of British foreign policy in that "low dishonest decade" should thus look elsewhere. They will be frustrated by the amount of time he spends with Londonderry, a man who lost what little significance he had when he was fired, somewhat unfairly, from government. He then compounded his unimportance by alienating many of the few who could be bothered to pay him any attention.

Had Londonderry gone quietly into retirement, Mr. Kershaw would not have much to say, but instead the fallen minister began the freelance diplomacy that shattered what was left of his reputation. In the hands of a lesser historian, these efforts, designed to promote a more friendly relationship between the Third Reich and Britain, could have been caricatured as the acts of a Nazi sympathizer, even a potential Quisling. Mr. Kershaw recognizes that Londonderry's motives were patriotic and basically well intentioned.

Friendship between Britain and Germany was, this veteran of the Somme believed, essential if the tragedy of another Great War was to be avoided. This was very different from supporting Hitler, or working to establish some sinister New Order in the sceptr'd isle. Even the photographs that illustrate this book under line the distance between Londonderry and the gangsters he was attempting to cultivate: We see him, Savile Row immaculate, posing with Hitler, being entertained by Goring, alongside his houseguest von Ribbentrop. In each picture, this British aristocrat seems guarded, a little uneasy, a thoroughly decent chap not altogether comfortable with the rough company he is keeping.

Certainly some of Londonderry's effusions about Hitler's "tremendous successes" make for very queasy reading. But, to put this into better context, Mr. Kershaw could have included some discussion of the useful idiots who were, at the same time, busy proclaiming the birth of a new civilization in Stalin's slaughterhouse Soviet Union. By comparison with such apologists, Londonderry was relatively restrained in the praise of his dictator. He shared with them, however, their determination to give evil the benefit of every doubt. And like them he lacked much empathy with those unfortunate enough to live under totalitarianism.

We see this most strikingly in Londonderry's underwhelming response to the plight of Germany's Jews. To be sure, he shared in the clubland anti-Semitism of many of his class, but this was a far cry from sympathy for Nazi cruelty. It appears to have been enough to let him regard Hitler's relentlessly grinding pogrom primarily as bad PR, an unnecessary obstacle to the necessary friendship between Britain and Germany. The idea that such horrors might have been evidence of a regime so pathological it could be no more trusted abroad than at home seem not to have occurred to him until too late.

Fortunately, there were others who did understand - none more so than his cousin, Winston Churchill. Relations between the two became, apparently, a little strained.

Measuring Man

Charles Murray: Human Accomplishment

American Outlook, December 1, 2004

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Did Charles Murray have a difficult time in high school? Judging by what he writes, when he writes, and how he writes, he’s someone who would not have enjoyed the conformist, unimaginative world of contemporary American secondary education. A controversialist who never knows when to stop, a math geek who understands what counts, Murray was probably jostled in the school yard, pushed about in the cafeteria, and, in that hallmark of intellectual independence, repeatedly hauled up in front of the principal. “Murray, don’t ever, ever argue with your teachers again.”

His best-known work, 1994’s The Bell Curve (co-written with Richard J. Herrnstein), triggered a spasm of denunciation, condemnation, and self-righteous indignation that an earlier heretic, the luckless Galileo, would have found all too familiar. It’s not necessary to agree with Murray and Herrnstein’s thesis to be struck by the nature of the criticism it generated, a carnival of vituperation where the language used, replete with keening cries of anathema and frenzied declarations of conformist piety, was more reminiscent of the deliberations of the Inquisition than any attempt at scientific discourse. The message? Suggestions that intelligence is an inherited characteristic are perilous and, if in any way associated with “race,” positively lethal.

So what, nine years later, has Murray gone and done? Indefatigable, delightfully tactless, and armored only with a thick cladding of protective statistics, America’s heretic has volunteered once more for the stake, this time as the author of a book that in essence argues that a wildly disproportionate part of mankind’s intellectual and cultural patrimony is the work of those reviled monsters, the “dead white males.” Will the man never learn?

Praising dead white males is bad enough, of course, but even if we put that grave offense to one side, it’s a sad reflection of the current intellectual climate to see that Murray’s belief in the possibility of making objective assessments of human achievement will likely be condemned as lunacy, and, worse still, as unacceptably—and archaically—“judgmental.” Seared by the inquisitorial fire last time, Murray tries to anticipate these objections with statistical method; taken in aggregate, he argues, the data cannot lie. It may be reasonable to disagree with the relative rankings of, to pick two of his greats, Michelangelo and Picasso, but not with the overall conclusion: “Now is a good time to stand back in admiration. What the human species is today it owes in astonishing degree to what was accomplished in just half a dozen centuries by the peoples of one small portion of the northwestern Eurasian land mass.”

But before any living white males are tempted to reach for brown shirts and chilled champagne, it’s important to recognize that Human Accomplishment is far from being a piece of ethnic cheerleading, nor is it any cause for Old World complacency. Always reliably gloomy, Murray warns, “it appears that Europe’s run is over. In another few hundred years, books will probably be exploring the reasons why some completely different part of the world became the locus of great human accomplishment.”

Murray’s method of reaching these conclusions is intriguing. To start with, he confines his examination of “accomplishment” to the sciences and the arts (some of them anyway; omissions include, dismayingly, architecture). That’s a little too narrow, in my judgment. There’s no room for the military, for example. In defense of that omission, Murray maintains that “putting ‘Defeated Hitler’ on the human résumé is too much like putting ‘beat my drug habit’ on a personal one,” but excluding the warriors and the warlords shuts out a Churchill or a Caesar, individuals who certainly ought to be found on any roll call of human genius. Governance and commerce are also eliminated. “Those achievements,” Murray avers, “are akin to paying the rent and putting food on the table, freeing Homo Sapiens to reach the heights within reach of the human mind and spirit—heights that are most visibly attained in the arts and sciences.”

There’s more than a touch of the ivory tower about Murray’s decision to restrict his investigation in this way, but it fits nicely with the aspirational message of Human Accomplishment: the arts and the sciences matter. More cynical folk will note that these areas of activity also lend themselves better than most to Murray’s approach. He writes,

After reviewing histories and chronologies of [commerce and governance], my judgment was that while it was possible to compile inventories of people and events, the compilations were unlikely to have either the face validity or the statistical reliability of the inventories for the arts and sciences. The process whereby commerce and governance have developed is too dissimilar from the process in the arts and sciences.

That’s true enough, and, more importantly, Murray’s relatively narrow focus doesn’t necessarily detract from the case he is trying to build. After all, success in the arts and sciences are not only worthy aims in themselves: taken together, they represent an excellent proxy for the achievements of a particular society at a particular time.

Good proxy or not, it’s still jarring to read about “the statistical reliability of the inventories for the arts.” “Statistical reliability” is bean-counter speak, hardly the lofty language usually associated with an early Picasso or the glories of a Turner sunset. This helps explain why some readers’ initial reaction to the methodology at the heart of Human Accomplishment will lie somewhere between incredulity, astonishment, and laughter. Mind you, Murray’s methodology is unusual enough to raise an eyebrow or two regardless of any aesthetic considerations. Basically (and this is a gross oversimplification), what he has done is count the footnotes. He has gone through a large number of reference books dedicated to the history of the arts and the sciences, and kept a tally of references to a particular individual or event. After subjecting the data to various statistical adjustments, those accomplishments that feature in the most references are, he asserts, likely to represent the pinnacles of man’s achievement. In “recounting . . . accomplishment in the arts, sciences, and philosophy for the last 2,800 years,” there are, concludes Murray, 3,869 people “without whom the story is incomplete.”

And not 3,870? At first sight this technique appears absurd, little more than the mathematics of the lunatic asylum, but statistics is nothing if not a patient discipline, and Murray carefully explains his logic. As an example, he demonstrates how it works when applied to Western art. He begins with “a staple of undergraduate art courses, Art Through The Ages.” In its sixth edition, “Michelangelo has the highest total of page references and examples of works devoted to him, more than twice the number devoted to either Picasso or Donatello, tied for number two. Then comes a tie among Giotto, Delacroix, and Bernini, followed by a tie among Leonardo, Rembrandt, and Dürer, and then still another tie between van Eyck and Raphael. . . . ”

He then turns to another standard text, H. W. Janson’s History of Art. Many of the names overlap, but Delacroix (somewhat surprisingly highly rated in Art Through The Ages) doesn’t make the top eleven, whereas Titian and Masaccio do. Repeat this exercise enough times with enough sensibly chosen reference books, and the list is likely to end up dominated by the same names again and again, a list, Murray argues, that is a fair measure of artistic greatness. The high correlations are “a natural consequence of the attempt by knowledgeable critics . . . to give the most attention to the most important people. Because different critics are tapping into a common understanding of importance in their field, they make similar choices. Various factors go into the estimate of importance, but they are in turn substantially associated with excellence.”

Of course, there are many potential problems with this method, but although I am no statistician and Human Accomplishment is (casual readers beware) a math-heavy tome, it is impossible not to be impressed by the steps its author has taken to deal with some of the more obvious objections, particularly those involving cultural, geographical, ethnic, and gender bias, let alone the dread offense (and worse word) of epochcentrism. If, at times, the results make uncomfortable reading for the politically correct, those people should not look for much consolation from Murray: “it is important,” he warns, “not to conflate aspirations with history.”

This is not to say that Murray would claim that his method is perfect. His decision to create separate categories for what he sees as the great literary traditions (Arabic, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and “Western”) is proof enough of that. How does one compare Shakespeare with Basho, or Kalidasa with Du Fu? And then there are those ancient feats of scientific discovery (fire, say, or the wheel) that underpin our society more than any microchip—who gets the credit for those? Murray sidesteps some tricky questions of attribution by beginning his survey at a comparatively late date in human history (and 800 B.C. is a comparatively late date), but even this maneuver doesn’t address those more recent human achievements that are now vanished from memory. If the Iliad hadn’t survived, for example, it would not have been included in Murray’s database, but would it have been any less of an accomplishment? In all likelihood, not enough such works have been lost, or discoveries forgotten, to invalidate Murray’s argument, but it is difficult not to think of these and other such issues when trying to weigh the wisdom of what he is trying to say.

These problems do not, however, undermine the core of his case: the central and defining role of Europe (and its American extension), particularly over the last half-millennium, as the pacesetter of human accomplishment. This ought to be a statement of the obvious. In much the same way as the small plaque in London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral dedicated to its architect simply states, “si monumentum requiris, circumspice,” so it is with Europe’s contribution to civilization. Just look around you.

Sadly, however, we live in an age when such commonsense observations can set off a scandal. Murray laments how

the idea of the Noble Savage . . . has reemerged in our own time. It has become fashionable to decry modern technology. Multiculturalism, as that word is now understood, urges us to accept all cultures as equally praiseworthy. Who is to say that the achievements of Europe, China, India, Japan, or Arabia, are “better” than those of Polynesia, Africa or the Amazon? Embedded in this mindset is hostility to the idea that discriminating judgments are appropriate in assessing art and literature, or that hierarchies of value exist—hostility as well to the idea that objective truth exists.

Of course, there’s no denying that, with all its lists and scatter diagrams, there is a hint of madness in the method that Murray uses to inventory “our species at its best.” Nevertheless, fans of insanity will discover far more to delight them in the posturing of today’s intellectual establishment, with its poisonous mix of self-loathing, political correctness, and frivolity, than in anything to be found in Human Accomplishment.

That said, there’s a danger that Murray’s readers may be left asking themselves exactly what his 668 pages are for. As a miscellany of intriguing information and quirkily intelligent observations, the book is a delight. To take two examples, both the charming description of the twelfth-century Chinese city of Hangzhou and the concept of a “meta-invention” (by which he means “the introduction of a new cognitive tool [such as logic] for dealing with the world around us”) are worth the price of admission alone; but, by themselves, they are commentary, not a theme.

More useful, perhaps, is to see Murray’s ratings of excellence as a valuable antidote to the ethos of an age deeply prejudiced against the notion of genuine achievement. As Murray reminds us, “excellence is not simply a matter of opinion, though judgment enters into its identification. Excellence has attributes that can be identified, evaluated, and compared across works.” Indeed it does. But if Murray is not just to be the highbrow equivalent of the record-store nerds in novelist Nick Hornby’s High Fidelity (“We’re messing around at work, the three of us, getting ready to go home and rubbishing each other’s five best side-one track-ones of all time”), there has to be more to Human Accomplishment than an accumulation of lists, applause, and fascinating facts.

So, is it the shocking science of IQ, genes, gender, and race? Is Human Accomplishment’s tale of dead white male success merely a return to some of the Bell Curve’s most controversial contentions? Somewhat cagily, Murray notes that “almost all of the current evidence regarding the causes of group differences is circumstantial and inconclusive. The debate will not have to depend on circumstantial evidence much longer, however. Within a few decades, we will know a great deal about the genetic differences between groups. Not all of the controversy will go away, but the room for argument will narrow substantially.”

Cagey, perhaps, but fair enough. That said, Murray’s conclusion that “it therefore seems pointless to use historical patterns of accomplishment to try to anticipate what these genetic findings will be” is disingenuous. Although he writes, correctly, that “biological and environmental explanations [for different rates of achievement among different ethnic groups or between the sexes] can both play a role, separately or interacting in such complex ways that the line between the roles of biology and environment blurs,” it is clear that he sees biology as highly important in the equation. His discussion of the extraordinary success of Ashkenazi Jews, for example, leaves little room for doubt that he believes that a good deal of the credit is due to their genes.

And if that could be true for the Ashkenazim, why not for other ethnic or racial groups? It is no surprise, then, to discover that the book contains a favorable reference or two to Francis Dalton, one of the most famous (or infamous, depending on your view) of the Darwinian danger men. Yes, of course Murray is entitled, and right, to insert the (handily diplomatic) disclaimer that it is still impossible to come to a precise assessment of the relative contributions of nature and nurture to individual and group differences, but that disclaimer comes at a high price. If he is suggesting that we may be on the verge of scientific discoveries that could transform our understanding of the sources of human accomplishment, logically this must substantially dilute the importance of much of what he is trying to say about that topic now.

That, doubtless, would be a disappointment to Murray. He has more than a touch of the teacher about him, and much of Human Accomplishment is best seen as an instruction manual for our species. It is this, I suppose, that the book is for. Murray being Murray, the controversialist extraordinaire, his advice makes uncomfortable reading for the vapidly sentimental. Money, he explains, makes the world go round—faster. Too much consensus or too much family can hold back achievement. War, amusingly, need not. Despite a somewhat shaky grasp of history and horology, The Third Man’s Harry Lime understood this perfectly: “In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed. But they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love, and they had five hundred years of democracy and peace. And what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.” Needless to say, democracy fares no better with Murray than with Lime. The record so far (distorted, admittedly, by the fact that democracies were very rare until recently) shows that a political structure permitting individual autonomy has been more valuable than the mere existence of universal suffrage. In this conclusion, Murray is clearly correct.

To Murray, it is, above all, the extent to which individuals use that autonomy to realize their potential that makes accomplishment possible. One of the most refreshing aspects of this book is the critical importance attached to the individual: “one may acknowledge the undoubted role of the cultural context in fostering or inhibiting great art, but still recall that it is not enough that the environment be favorable. Somebody must actually do the deed.” Doing the deed (in the sciences just as much as the arts) and, in the case of the most talented of all, having a shot at joining Murray’s blessed 3,869, involves extraordinary amounts of work (some of that “perspiration” that Thomas Edison was always talking about) and a degree of commitment that can often tip over into monomania. Murray argues that this takes not only talent but also a sense of some higher purpose. This is likely to be grounded in religion (Murray argues, for example, that post-medieval Christianity offered Europe particular competitive advantages). Even if it is not, however, such a sense of purpose will be impossible to reconcile with the “ennui, anomie, [and] alienation” that, Murray suggests, account for the twentieth-century artistic and cultural decay and are, quite clearly, the villains of his fascinating and stimulating book.

It is a beguiling argument, to be sure, but to return tactlessly to an earlier topic, will the issue that Murray has so elegantly tried to dodge reduce what he has to say to irrelevance? The notion that an individual’s future is irrevocably determined, in a Calvinism of the genes, by his or her biological make-up will probably always be the crudest of caricatures, but caricatures can be surprisingly persuasive. After all, Murray tells us,

after Freud [and] Nietzsche . . . it became fashionable . . . to see humans as unwittingly acting out neuroses and subconscious drives. God was mostly dead. Morality became relative. These and allied beliefs substantially undermined the belief of creative elites that their lives had purpose or that their talents could be efficacious.

That is probably quite true, but our increasing understanding of genetic science may mean that a far greater philosophical challenge is lurking just over the horizon. As Murray has said, “all we need is a few decades’ patience.”

Hang onto your hats.

It's Time

National Review Online, November 29, 2004

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New York City, Saturday—In Manhattan, they say, everyone wears black, but not this Saturday, not in this plaza just across from the U.N. The demonstrators, perhaps 500, perhaps more, have turned up on this briefly glorious late autumn day in orange hats, in orange scarves, in orange coats, in orange sweaters, draped in orange blankets, wearing orange ribbons; anything, however small, will do so long as it is orange. Baseball cap advertising Land Rover? No problem. If it's orange, it's fine. Sweatshirt proclaiming the virtues of Steinway pianos? Why not? It's orange. Orange flags flutter, orange balloons bob against a clear, lovely sky that matches the blue on the other flag, pale blue and yellow, which flies this day. Blue and yellow, the colors of Ukraine, and orange the color of the movement that might, maybe, finally bring the people of that country the decent government they have awaited for far too long. "Pora". "It's time." Indeed it is.

Banners, orange naturally, proclaim the loyalties of the crowd:

"Yuschenko—Yes!"

"A Criminal Should Not Be President."

"Putin, Don't Mess With Ukraine."

"Boston Ukrainians for Yuschenko."

"America and Ukraine Together."

"Kyiv, We're With You."

"Ukrainians Deserve Freedom Just Like You."

Indeed they do. In the 20th century, the people of the Ukraine, a land of two genocides, the country of Hitler's Babi Yar, and the nation of Stalin's broken, emptying starving villages, went through the worst that two totalitarian systems could do to them, the raw death toll, millions after millions after millions, supplemented by decade after decade after decade of more selective, careful purges, a cull of the best and the brightest, generation after generation after generation.

And yet, somehow, Ukraine endured.

But Putin seems to feel little or no remorse for the crimes of his Kremlin predecessors. There have been no real apologies, and no trials of those butchers who still survive. As the Russian president looks at those other far, far larger crowds in orange, the ones gathered for days in Kiev's Independence Square, he sees, doubtless, only irritants, troublemakers, hooligans, obstacles to be removed, perhaps even dupes, according to some in Moscow, of wicked Polish plotters. What he should be seeing are the countless ghosts of those that went before, victims of that Soviet past that even now he seems curiously unwilling to confront. That, however, would take a conscience.

In 1933 (wrote the writer Vasily Grossman) "horses pulled flattop carts through [Kiev], and the corpses of those who had died in the night were collected. I saw one such flattop cart with children on it. They were just as I have described them, thin, elongated faces, like those of dead birds, with sharp beaks...Some of them were still muttering, and their heads still turning. I asked the driver about them, and he just waved his hands and said: "By the time they get where they are being taken they will be silent too." There was, we should remember, more food in Kiev than anywhere else in the Ukraine that year. Five, six, seven million died in that Soviet-made famine, the Holodomor, maybe an even greater number: no one knows for sure.

Standing in that New York plaza I talk to one of the demonstrators, Marko, about what's going on. We touch on the past. "My father," he says, "survived the Holodomor." I look around at some of the older faces in the crowd, and wonder what they had heard back then, what they knew, what they had lived through.

Not inappropriately, perhaps, there is behind us a memorial to Raoul Wallenberg, the Swede who rescued thousands of Jews from wartime Budapest only to disappear into Stalin's hands. A small plaque reads that on "January 17th, 1945 Raoul Wallenberg was detained by the Soviet government. His fate remains unknown." Fate unknown. Just another ghost. Not inappropriately, perhaps, someone in the crowd is carrying a placard showing Putin in a KGB uniform.

Someone else has a sign announcing that she is from Donetsk, the city that is the heart of the Ukraine's mainly Russian-speaking east, an area that is likely to come into sharp focus in coming weeks—exaggerated it may have been, but there is no doubt that Russia's candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, has real support in that part of the country. Taras, a friend of mine who's also at the demonstration, is more optimistic. His father, from Ternopil in western Ukraine (the city where Viktor Yuschenko had studied as a young man) had just returned from Kiev. While he was there he'd talked to a few of the miners who have been shipped in from the East to rally support for Yanukovych, the second-round "winner." They were O.K. guys, he said, enjoying an all-expenses, all-vodka trip to the big city with no plans to stick around for long. We'll see.

But Saturday is not a day for such worries. The likeable crowd, mainly twenty or thirtysomethings, a blend of recent immigrants, visitors, and the diaspora, were festive, optimistic, excited, cheering the speeches, the singers, and the sentiment, pausing only to chant the only name that counted, the name of their president:

"Yushchenko, Yushchenko, Yushchenko."

He's their hero, their man, their champion, and their best hope for the true restoration of a squandered independence. In fact, like many politicians that emerged in the rougher corners of post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Yuschenko is not free from awkward questions about his past, or the nature of some of his support, but this is not something that anyone wants to think about this day.

"Yushchenko, Yushchenko, Yushchenko."

An older woman points to a poster, a standard politician-and-child image, the usual fluff, and shakes her head sadly. "It's terrible what they've done to him." The man in the photograph is healthy, good-looking, fortyish. It's Yuschenko, and the picture was probably taken less than a year ago. His face looks nothing like the terrible, cratered wreck that it has become, the product, almost certainly of a poison attack, an attack that has transformed him into a martyr for the cause, the real cause, he now leads.

The crowd starts to sing a lovely, enchanting tune, verse after verse. They know the words, and they sing them smiling. "The national anthem?" I ask. "No", two women say, "It's like a pledge." "What's it called?" Thought. Pause. Embarrassed looks. "We don't know." And then they start to laugh.

It's time.

How Enlightenment Dies

National Review Online, November 12, 2004

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Amid all the weird, wild wailing in Manhattan, amid the hot air and hysteria in Hollywood, amid all the crazy-lady shrieks of mainstream-media anguish (yes, Maureen, I'm talking about you) and the banshee howling of liberal complaint, Americans heard one overarching theme from the disappointed and distraught left—one meme, one fear, one insult that finally spoke its name. Jesusland (that's what they call it now) had won. The America of Jefferson and Madison had fallen, delivered by Karl Rove into the hands of ranting theocrats, holy rollers and the monstrous ghost of William Jennings Bryan. Writing in the New York Times, an overwrought Garry Wills had this to say:

The secular states of modern Europe do not understand the fundamentalism of the American electorate. It is not what they had experienced from this country in the past. In fact, we now resemble those nations less than we do our putative enemies.

The title of his article? "The Day the Enlightenment Went Out."

Oh really? If it was the fate of the Enlightenment for which Mr. Wills feared, he would have done better looking some 3,000 miles to his east, to lovely, wounded Amsterdam, a city once famed for its brisk, North Sea tolerance, a city that now mourns the death of an artist killed for speaking his mind. On November 2, the very day of the election that was to so sadden Garry Wills, an assassin in Amsterdam murdered the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh—shot him, stabbed him, and then butchered him like a sacrificial sheep. Van Gogh, you see, had transgressed the code of the fanaticism that has now made its home in Holland. And for that he had to die.

The movie that doomed Van Gogh was Submission, a ten-minute film shown on Dutch TV earlier this year. A collaboration with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee and Muslim apostate who is now a member of the Dutch parliament, the film is a caustic attack on Muslim misogyny. Back in September, Marlise Simons of the New York Times described some of its scenes thus:

As she begins to pray, the woman looks heavily veiled, showing her eyes only, but her long black chador turns out to be transparent. Beneath it, painted on her chest and stomach, there are verses from the Koran. More women appear. A bride is dressed in white lace, but her back is naked. The Koranic verse that says a man may take his woman in any manner time or place ordained by God is written on her skin. The images roll on, now showing a woman lying on the ground, her back and legs marked by red traces of a whip. The Koranic verses on her wounded flesh say that those guilty of adultery or sex outside marriage shall be punished with 100 lashes. There are chilling sounds of a cracking whip; there is the haunting beauty of the Arabic calligraphy and soft music.

In a country in which Muslims account for nearly six percent of the population, there was predictable outrage from predictable sources. Ayaan Hirsi Ali added more death threats to her already substantial collection (she has been living under police protection for some years), and Van Gogh gathered a few of his own. Despite that, he declined the help of the cops. They hadn't, he pointed out, managed to save the rightist politician Pim Fortuyn from assassination back in 2002. Besides, he argued, who would think it worth their while to gun down the "village idiot"? And so this appalling, brave, obnoxious, and foul-mouthed provocateur, an opponent of religious intolerance whatever its source—an ornery chain-smoking contrarian who relished describing himself as a "professional adolescent, a die-hard reactionary"—carried on writing, filming, grumbling, grousing, and cursing.

With a horrible—and ironic—appropriateness, Van Gogh's final film was an investigation into the murder of the equally truculent Fortuyn, a killing that he blamed partly on the demonization of Fortuyn by "leftwing, politically correct...politicians." Like Fortuyn, he too was to die for his views and like, I suspect, Fortuyn, in those final terrifying moments Van Gogh would, despite his often-expressed fears for Holland's future (and, half-seriously, his own), almost certainly have been astonished that matters had really come to this—that the Netherlands had fallen so far. Forget the victim's evocative name (he was the great grandson of the painter's brother); even his mode of transport—the bicycle he was riding when the assassin struck—conjures up images of Holland, of the practical, somewhat earnest civilization that nurtured him: a kindly, almost painfully fair civilization so sensitive to the rights of the accused that the full name of the alleged murderer still cannot be officially disclosed; a tolerant, decent civilization that finds itself now threatened.

And who better to explain that threat, than B, Mijnheer B, Mohammed B? After, allegedly (we must, I suppose, use that word) shooting his victim, B started to stab him. In a last attempt to save his life, a desperate Van Gogh reportedly pleaded with his attacker: "We can," he said, "still talk about it." Talk. Dialog. Reason. In response, savagery. The murderer sawed through Van Gogh's neck and spinal column with a butcher knife, almost severing his head. And that, Mr. Wills, is how Enlightenment dies.

The killer then concluded the desecration by using another knife to pin a letter onto Van Gogh's corpse. This letter, which is addressed to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, is a frenzied blend of superstition, anti-Semitism, and, as this extract shows, morbid obsession:

There is one certainty in the whole of existence; and that is that everything comes to an end. A child born unto this world and fills this universe with its presence in the form of its first life's cries, shall ultimately leave this world with its death cry. A blade of grass sticking up its head from the dark earth and being caressed by the sunlight and fed by the descending rain, shall ultimately whither and turn to dust. Death, Miss Hirsi Ali, is the common theme of all that exists. You, me, and the rest of creation cannot disconnect from this truth. There shall be a day where one soul cannot help another soul. A day with terrible tortures and torments, a day where the unjust shall force from their tongues horrible screams. Screams, Miss Hirsi Ali, that will cause shivers to roll down one's spine; that will make hair stand up from heads. People will be seen drunk with fear while they are not drunk. FEAR shall fill the atmosphere on that great day.

And what's in store for the rest of us?

"I deem thee lost, O America. I deem thee lost, O Europe. I deem thee lost, O Holland."

These, regrettably, do not appear to have been the words of a lone lunatic. A total of nine men, all of Middle Eastern or North African ethnic origin, have so far been arrested in connection with Van Gogh's murder. There is the usual, and not unconvincing, talk of shadowy international terrorist connections, perhaps even with al Qaeda. Meanwhile, two other Dutch Muslims have been detained in connection with the Internet posting of a video promising "paradise" for anyone who managed to behead Geert Wilders, a right-wing politician outspoken in his opposition to immigration.

Mass immigration, of course, played a part in creating the social pathologies that cost Van Gogh his life, but its effects were exacerbated by official Holland's embrace of multiculturalism, a dogma that made integration impossible and alienation a certainty. Crucially, the Dutch appear to have abandoned teaching the mutual tolerance, however rough-and-ready, that is essential to the functioning of a free society. Instead they opted for the walking-on-eggshells sensitivities of multiculturalism, and a state of mind in which open debate, if someone somewhere could deem it offensive, was a danger, not a delight. In a country that was drawing many of its immigrants from traditions where notions of tolerance had little or no part to play, the consequences should have been obvious. If liberal democracy is to survive in all its noisy acrimony, all of its citizens—even the most disaffected, even the most devout, even the B's—need to develop a thick skin. In Holland, nobody showed them how. To Van Gogh, multiculturalism was farcical. And for Van Gogh it was a farce that turned lethal.

In the aftermath of Van Gogh's murder people behaved in ways that were thoughtful, thuggish, moving, and almost certainly quite futile. There was tough talk from the government, an outbreak of arson attacks on a number of mosques, and a spontaneous 20,000-strong protest in central Amsterdam: The crowd banged pots and pans, the crowd blew horns and whistles. The noise symbolized Dutch freedom of speech and had been requested by the Van Gogh family. Silence was not the way to honor their Theo.

But for the responses to this crisis that give the best clue as to what will happen next, look elsewhere—perhaps to the decision by two Dutch TV stations to abandon their plans to broadcast Submission, or, perhaps, to the objections expressed by some leading politicians to the deputy prime minister's declaration of war against Islamic extremism. "We fall too easily into an 'us and them' antithesis with the word war," complained one, the leader of the Greens—words beyond parody that Van Gogh would have enjoyed parodying, had he lived long enough to hear them.

Or go, perhaps, to Rotterdam, and stare at a wall. A few days ago, a local artist reacted to the news of Van Gogh's killing by painting a mural that included the words "Gij zult niet doden" ("Thou Shalt Not Kill"). Fair comment, you might think. Apparently not. The head of a nearby mosque complained. The police showed up and city workers sandblasted the inconvenient text into oblivion. Rotterdam's mayor has since apologized, but the damage had already been done.

"Thou Shalt Not Kill." Erased, obliterated, unacceptable. Much like Theo van Gogh.

Queen of The Desert

Christopher Buckley: Queen of the Desert

National Review, November 8, 2004

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All it takes for evil to prevail, warned Burke, is “for enough good men to do nothing.” True; but that doesn’t mean that the good men cannot occasionally relax with a good laugh or two. It might even help them, especially in a situation of the kind the West faces today: a war with an ideology so dedicated to the destruction of happiness that, in the shape of the Taliban, it made laughing too loud in public a crime. (For women, anyway.)

In Florence of Arabia, his dark, disturbing, and very funny new satire, Christopher Buckley highlights the cruelty of radical Islamism and the contradictions of America’s response to it. He does this against a backdrop not of history at its grimmest or journalism at its most intense, but of jokes, mockery, bouts of wordplay (a State Department bureaucrat is a “desk-limpet,” an Arab potentate has lips that are “oyster-moist from a life- time’s contact with the greatest delicacies the world [has] to offer”), and puns that teeter on the edge of catastrophe: The repressive Arab kingdom that is—along, naturally, with France—the main villain of this book goes by the name of Wasabia.

Wasabia is a sand-swept nightmare marked by oil wealth, joylessness, corruption, and ritualized cruelty, a tyranny where “offenses that in other religions would earn you a lecture from the rabbi, five Hail Marys from a priest, and, for Episcopalians, a plastic pink flamingo on your front lawn” are punished by “beheading, amputation, flogging, blinding, and having your tongue cut out . . . A Google search using the key phrases ‘Wasabia’ and ‘La Dolce Vita’ results in no matches.” Well, Prince Bandar, does that remind you of anywhere?

Gallows humor? Certainly. But insofar as the jihadists—with their car bombs, suicide bombs, and dreams of dirty bombs and worse—wish to shove you and me into mass graves at the earliest possible moment, a touch of Tyburn does not seem amiss. Of course, there are people who will find some of what Buckley has to say distinctly, you know, insensitive. The caliphs of multiculturalism will twitch a little, and this is not a book that will find many fans in Foggy Bottom (“the State Department’s reflexive response to any American in extremis overseas is to hand them a pamphlet—along with a list of incompetent local lawyers—and say, ‘We told you so’”).

But satire should not make comfortable reading for the subscribers to any orthodoxy. Running through this book is the clear implication that the American approach to the Middle East has not worked out quite as well as might have been hoped. And what, exactly, is the role played in Buckley’s drama by the Waldorf Group, an investment company (named, hmmm, after a New York hotel) that has danced a little too long, a little too closely, and a little too profitably with the despots of Wasabia?

But about Buckley’s heroine Florence, at least, there are no doubts. Forced out of the State Department for her unwanted imagination and initiative, she now has a new assignment: using covert funds to set up a TV station to transmit to the Arab masses. This will not, of course, be another Al-Jazeera, glossily repackaging nationalist resentments and religious prejudice 24/7, but nor will it be a source of ticky-tacky U.S. propaganda, ineffectively boasting about multicultural contentment in midwestern suburbs. Instead it will be something altogether more revolutionary, directed at the most excluded and mistreated of all the Arab masses: women. This will be Lifetime for women who really have no lives, its purpose to promote female emancipation as a counterbalance to militant Islam.

Qatar, the home of Al-Jazeera, being presumably unavailable, Florence’s TV station is hosted by the venal but fairly relaxed emirate of Matar (“pronounced, for reasons unclear, Mutter”), a state let created by Churchill at one of those colonial conferences that have done so much to make the Middle East the cheery place that it is today. “One might suspect,” writes Buckley, “that its borders had been drawn so as to deprive . . . Wasabia of access to the sea. One would be right.” The result was to leave Matar rich, permanently grateful to old Winston (spotting Matar’s Churchillian place names is one of the book’s many pleasures), and under the control of a royal family that knows how to handle its mullahs: cash, cars, and “an annual six-week paid sabbatical, which most of them chose to take in the South of France, one of Islam’s holiest sites.”

This relatively tolerant country makes an ideal base for Florence and her offbeat and entertaining team: a delightfully cynical PR man, a State Department employee so camp that he could have been pitching tents with T. E. Lawrence, and a CIA Col. Kurtz lite (a seductive— ask Florence—and effective mix of Esquire and Soldier of Fortune).

Throughout, Buckley’s lightly ironic tone only accentuates the savagery that is his main target, making it somehow all the more terrible when, as in this extract, it comes into clear, brutal focus:

The package turned out to contain a videotape. It showed Fatima buried in sand up to her neck, being stoned to death with small rocks. The tape was twenty minutes long. Everyone who watched it wept. Florence brought the tape to Laila. She could not bring herself to view it again so she left the room while Laila viewed it. She waited outside on the terrace, looking out over the Gulf in the moonlight, her skin misted by salty droplets from the fountain that spouted out the royal crest. Laila emerged, pale and shaken. Neither woman spoke. The two of them stood by the balustrade overlooking the gardens, listening to the waves lap the shore and the onshore breeze rustle the fronds of the date palms.

And then, right at the end of this book, cruel, bleak, awful reality finally comes crashing in. There, in the closing acknowledgments, Buckley pays tribute to Fern Holland, “a real-life Florence of Arabia,” who was assassinated in Iraq on March 9, 2004.

She was trying to help, and that would not do.

The Deer Hunter

National Review Online,  October 26, 2004

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Carefully, silent lest he alert his foe, crouching, hunched, sometimes crawling, a camouflaged and heavily armed John Kerry makes his way across the harsh terrain. Later he emerges from this test by fire, this ordeal, to run for the White House on the back of tales of hardship and triumph, tales that some who were not there have the impudence to question, tales like this: "I go out with my trusty 12-gauge double-barrel, crawl around on my stomach. I track and move and decoy and play games and try to outsmart them. You know, you kind of play the wind. That's hunting" Yes, hunting. Did you think that I was talking about something else?

For reasons that have a little to do with the Second Amendment and a lot to do with Serotta John's need to bond with the Cabela's crowd, the Democratic candidate has been at carefully choreographed pains to show what a keen hunter he is—and always has been: "When I was a kid I used to hunt woodchuck, predators on the farm. I started with a BB gun, moved up to a .22, then a .30/30, and a shotgun. And I've shot birds off and on through my life, some game, rabbits, deer—I've been on Massachusetts deer hunts."

Yup. No nuance there, bub, no way.

Ah, but there is. Just in case some of Kerry's more sensitive supporters are offended by the thought of too many carcasses, nuance comes slithering back in: "I once had an incredible encounter with the most enormous buck—I don't know, 16 points or something. It was just huge. And I failed to pull the trigger at the right moment." And if that sounds to you just a teeny bit too much like that moment in The Deer Hunter when Michael Vronsky (a decorated hero of the Vietnam war, you know) gets a deer in his sights and decides not to shoot, well, you should be ashamed of yourself.

But, as Kerry tells it, this encounter seems to have been a rare armistice in his war against wildlife. For as his election campaign has continued, so have the bird bloodbaths and so, as the Washington Post's Laura Blumenfeld had the bad luck to discover, has the gory small talk: "Carve out the heart, he said over dinner, pull out the entrails and cut up the meat."

His victims? Well, there were the poor pheasants that perished in Iowa, a month or two before that state's critical primaries, and, most recently, the hapless geese butchered in Ohio just a few days ago (the New York Times noted that the Massachusetts Nimrod emerged from the fray with a hand "stained with goose blood"). Wisely, perhaps, in the context of a wartime election, Kerry has refrained from dove-shooting, but the senator still has fond memories of gunning down everyone's favorite bird of peace. According to the clearly traumatized Ms. Blumenfeld, this cornfield Krueger likes to watch doves "flutter and dart" before he fires. Then (PETA folk, look away) he will, he says, eat them. "You clean them. Let them hang. It takes three or four birds to have a meal. You might eat it at a picnic, cold roasted. I love dove."

Dove may or may not taste good (like the late President Mitterand, Kerry seems more like an Ortolan fan to me) but in stressing that he at least eats what he kills (the Iowa pheasants were, we were informed, sent to Kerry's home—the one in Boston—and two of the unfortunate Ohio geese, would, an aide told the New York Times, "soon be sent back to Mr. Kerry for consumption") the senator is almost certainly making a, well, let's use the word, nuanced, gesture to supporters such as the Humane Society of the U.S., which has somehow managed to endorse the great hunter despite, ahem, its own stern opposition to hunting and, indeed, its rather dim view of snacking on dove ("minimal sustenance," apparently).

If the Humane Society is comfortable with Kerry, many hunters are not. Some of them have been treating his hunting history with the same lack of respect that other naysayers have shown his stories of Christmas in Cambodia, the Boston marathon, and Chinese assault rifles. Doubtful about those Iowa pheasants? Well, check in with the ambiguously named website Sportsmen for Kerry/Edwards? There you can find Bush-bulge-style analysis of John Kerry's dog, John Kerry's thumb, and, to complete the murky picture, John Kerry's trigger finger. Other skeptics have claimed that no one, no one, would ever "hang" a dove (no, I really have no idea), while at least one blogger has even questioned whether any geese in those Ohio killing fields were really shot by Kerry.

But it was Kerry's claim that he crawled around on his stomach, "playing the wind," in pursuit of deer that stirred up the most suspicions. While this is what you do in Scotland (I write from sodden, scratched, and muddy experience), it is not the approach usually taken in America. To the NRA's executive director, Kerry's description was "so utterly bizarre" it made him "wonder whether Kerry has ever hunted a deer in his life." Anyone thinking of trying his deer-hunting tactics should "at least wear some blaze orange" so other hunters don't confuse him with "a snake slithering through the brush." And then there's Mark Steyn. Neither he nor "any of his New Hampshire neighbors" had "ever heard of anybody deer hunting by crawling around on his stomach, even in Massachusetts. The trick is to blend in with the woods and, given that John Kerry already looks like a forlorn tree in late fall, it's hard to see why he'd give up his natural advantage in order to hunt horizontally."

Sensing trouble over Crawlgate, the Kerry campaign turned for help not to his band of brothers, but, as the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel explained, to a cousin, one Bruce Droste, "who said he hunted deer with Kerry roughly half-a-dozen times in Massachusetts, most recently about seven years ago... The hunts were tied to an annual house party on private property, and the hunters used buckshot, partly for safety reasons, because of its short range. 'When you see (a deer), you absolutely freeze. Then the game is to see how you can get closer. . . . So you crawl along until you know you have a dead ringer shot.'" The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel reports. You decide.

In reality, of course, the devil in this case is not in the details, not in the crawling hunter, the hanging dove, or even those notorious geese, but in the broader suspicion that Kerry's hunting fables are yet more evidence of a candidate unable both to be himself and to be elected. It's his awareness of this, more than anything else, that explains those infamous flip-flops, and it's that awareness—plus the understanding that Kerry needs the Hank Hill vote—that explains this odd, awkward, aloof pretense at being one of the boys.

Now, there's nothing too unusual about a politician who panders, but there is something disconcerting about what Kerry's outreach to outdoorsmen reveals about his view of their political sophistication. They are, Kerry appears to think, simpletons who can be won over by sportsman's tales, talk of his "beloved" Red Sox, and the illusion that the senator's supposed fondness for hunting signals a deep belief in the Second Amendment—an amendment that has, in fact, far more to do with the right of self-defense than the ability to chase, or crawl, after deer.

Meanwhile, the candidate's grimly entertaining and appallingly patronizing, pandering pastiche of a regular guy is likely to continue down to the wire. In Pike County, Ohio, the proprietors of the Buchanan Village Store were subjected to the newly dumbed-down grammar of ("Can I get me a hunting license here?") of the Yale intellectual who is fluent in French, but no longer, it seems, his native tongue. What will Kerry say if he goes on the campaign trail into deepest Appalachia?

"Squeal like a pig?"

The Curious Discretion of Teresa Heinz Kerry

national Review Online, October 19, 2004

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If there's one thing that we have learned about Teresa Heinz Kerry it is that she is a woman who is not shy, as she repeatedly likes to remind us, about speaking her mind. Over the last few months, this splendidly bizarre, undeniably batty, figure has entertained, appalled, and enthralled Americans with her opinions—and her ignorance—on a startling range of issues. No wars for oil! Bin Laden will be the October surprise! Gin and white raisins cure arthritis!

When it comes to talking about her taxes, however, the voluble—and supposedly fearless—Mrs. Heinz Kerry has been uncharacteristically tongue-tied, preferring instead to hide behind her children. Citing their privacy (thanks to the Heinz trusts, her finances are deeply intertwined with those of her sons) she has held out against full disclosure of her 2003 tax records. As she explained back in April, "What I have and what I receive is not just mine, it is also my children's, and I don't know that I have the right to make public what is theirs...If I could separate it, I would have no problem."

Well, we are unlikely ever to know what attempts were made to separate these interests out for disclosure purposes, but, after a release discreetly timed for last Friday afternoon, we have now discovered how much of her 2003 returns Teresa Heinz Kerry is prepared to share with the rest of us: Two pages. That's about a page for every $2,500,000 in income. Gee, thanks.

As always with such paperwork, what's left out is far, far more interesting than what's left in. Those old, or jaundiced, enough to remember the Clintons' generosity with their used underwear will be disappointed that no details were given of Mrs. Kerry's charitable donations, or even of how much they were. Could it be, who knows, that Teresa was a little stingy last year, or could it be, perhaps, that she gave to some charities that might prove a little embarrassing in an election year?

Baseless innuendo? Very possibly. But there's an easy way to show that these suggestions are completely unfair. Disclose the full form, Teresa. Privacy? Oh, come off it. How can disclosure of any part of Mrs. Kerry's personal 1040 relate to her children, all of whom are now in their thirties?

But then there are the pesky, yet handy, family trusts (widely believed to be worth about around one billion dollars) that must mean so much to Teresa and her boys. As the New York Times noted with, incredibly, a hint of disapproval, nothing, nothing, was disclosed about them: "If the trusts are as large as reported—and the Kerry campaign has not challenged the billion dollar estimate—then even a modest 5 percent return would have generated $50 million of income, 10 times what was on the two pages released by Ms. Heinz Kerry."

Trusts and income this large, even if only partly controlled by a potential future First Lady, matter. We've already seen how Teresa effectively helped finance her husband's campaign, at least in its bleaker moments. How her money is generated is, therefore, of some interest as is its potential, particularly in the context of a campaign that has made so much out of "Halliburton," for conflicts (or the perception of conflicts) of interest.

Teresa, of course, continues to use her family's "privacy" as a justification for this billion-dollar omission. It would be easier to have sympathy for that argument had not John Kerry's campaign manager only recently described Mary Cheney's sexual orientation as "fair game." And then there's Mrs. Edwards. She attributed Lynne Cheney's aversion to political point scoring over her daughter's private life to "a certain degree of shame." Charming.

To follow the sleazy logic of Elizabeth Edwards (oh, why not?) is there something about the Heinz trusts which Teresa finds "shameful"? Are some of their investments insufficiently PC? Could it be that the trusts are embarrassingly tax efficient? Are there any of those dreaded "conflicts"? Maybe the trusts are simply too large for their riches to be spelled out by a populist campaign already burdened with a candidate whose blue collar comes tailored by Turnbull & Asser. We don't know, of course, because they are not before our eyes.

And that privacy defense? Well, it was Mary Cheney's participation in her father's bid for reelection that, apparently, made her "fair game." While a comparison of the two cases cannot be stretched too far (no one is suggesting that Mary Cheney's finances be disclosed), it is worth remembering that two out of Teresa's three sons have been prominent in their stepfather's campaign. Given the exceptional circumstances, couldn't they, and their third brother, have agreed to, at least, some disclosure about the income generated by the trusts in which they and their mother are beneficiaries: It's not as if their wealth will come as a surprise to anyone.

But all this is to play Teresa's game. There is plenty that she could disclose without overly compromising her children's privacy, and, if only to avoid the suspicions that will otherwise inevitably arise, plenty that she should disclose. The reality, however, is that, for whatever reason, she simply isn't prepared to do so. Teresa Heinz Kerry has, instead, a different message for the electorate.

"Shove it."