A Tool, Not a Fetish

National Review, October 20, 2008

In the wake of Sept. 29’s dramatic House vote, the prospects, nature, and chances for success of any revived Paulson plan were, to say the least, uncertain. What remained certain was that some sort of rescue, bailout, pick the euphemism or pejorative of your choice, was still needed, and needed quickly. That this could ever have been a matter of serious debate is remarkable. Even more remarkable is the fact that a good number of those seemingly opposed to the very idea of a plan have come from the GOP. Washington’s Republicans are supposedly the flag bearers, however tatty, torn, and stained their flag, of what little economic literacy there is within the nation’s capital. Witnessing some of their recent pronouncements, not to speak of their votes, has been a depressing exercise.

As a starting point, we need to discard the distinction so often and so misleadingly drawn between Main Street (good) and Wall Street (bad), and its close cousin, the Pollyanna chatter about the “real” economy (healthy) and the financial world (sick). In fact, Wall Street and Main Street are just different points along the same road. Those who operate within the financial markets do so in the pursuit of their own economic interests, and there are occasional, inevitable, and sometimes spectacular speculative excesses; however, those operations generally facilitate the (reasonably) efficient allocation of capital to the rest of America. It shouldn’t be necessary to remind Republican congressmen that capital is the lifeblood of any economy. It’s worth adding that if anyone really thinks the vital principle of moral hazard — the notion that rescuing failing financiers will encourage others to take excessive risks — has been junked, or that the Paulson plan would have meant that Wall Street had “gotten away” with this mess, I can probably find some Lehman stock to sell him.

And that’s why referring to that plan, an initiative designed to defend this system, as (to quote various House and Senate Republicans) “financial socialism,” “un-American,” and an example of the “Leviathan state” at work is absurd. A belief in the effectiveness of free markets is one thing. Market fundamentalism is another.

Free markets are, to steal Winston Churchill’s famous comment about democracy, the worst way of running an economy “except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Free markets work better than the alternatives because no one person, organization, or government has the smarts to allocate resources more efficiently than can the collective wisdom of the crowd. But the free market should be a tool, not a fetish, and as with all tools, there are instructions for its use. To think that it can operate in Galt’s Gulch isolation is to ignore history and psychology, and to confuse the economics of Hayek with those of Mad Max.

Free markets need a financial, legal, and regulatory structure to provide the element of trust — without which they cannot work very well, as we saw in Boris Yeltsin’s chaotic Russia. And that basic structure, experience shows us, has to come from the state. The only real question is how extensive it should be. As the failures of socialism demonstrate, too much state intervention is counterproductive. But too little can also be disastrous, especially when it comes to preserving the trust that (for example) enables banks to borrow short and lend long, thereby ensuring the free flow of funds on which the economy relies.

A breakdown in trust has been all too evident in recent months, both to those of us in the financial markets (I work in international equities, but should stress that I am writing in a purely personal capacity) and, increasingly, to those working outside them. In the more insular political arena, there seems to have been rather less understanding. When, on Sept. 23, Sen. Richard Shelby (R., Ala.) suggested that the U.S. should make sure it has “exhausted all reasonable alternatives” before proceeding with the Paulson plan, it was impossible to avoid wondering what, at that late stage, he had in mind. And then there was the first House vote.

Whether it’s the slowdown in interbank lending, the drastic contraction in the commercial-paper market, or even the fact that in late September the U.S. Mint ran out of its one-ounce “American Buffalo” gold coins owing to a surge in investor demand, the signs of collapsing trust and mounting panic in the credit markets (gyrations in the stock market matter much less) are unmistakable — and profoundly disturbing.

And when panic takes over, it is indiscriminate. Sound institutions can fail along with those that deserve to. It’s not only exuberance that’s irrational; free markets may rely on the collective wisdom of crowds, but as Charles Mackay (the 19th-century author of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds) reminds us, crowds can go crazy. That’s why on some occasions the Fed has to take away the punchbowl, and on others come to the rescue.

Unfortunately, the problems this time are so great that the Fed’s interventions have not so far done the trick. At this point, government, the only institution with possibly enough resources (financial and otherwise) to halt this particular panic, has to step in with something very drastic indeed. It’s not pretty, or particularly ideologically comfortable for those of us on the right, but, like the free-market system, it’s pragmatic and, as such, thoroughly American. The Japanese delayed doing what they needed to do for years; the consequences are too well-known to need reciting here.

None of this is to claim that the original Paulson plan was perfect. It was very far from that (I’d have preferred a scheme with more direct equity investment in the troubled institutions). Equally, it must be acknowledged that the congressional Republicans’ criticisms improved the package’s terms prior to the first vote, if insufficiently to convince enough of them to vote yes. The problem is that, in the course of a panic on this scale, time is of the essence (this is not some bogus emergency on the usual Washington model). There is limited room for fine-tuning, with the markets waiting for a move.

As Rep. Henry Steagall (yes, that Steagall, and yes, he was a Democrat) wrote in 1932 about a fix proposed for an economic crisis:

Of course, it involves a departure from established policies and ideals, but we cannot stand by when a house is on fire to engage in lengthy debates over the methods to be employed in extinguishing the fire. In such a situation we instinctively seize upon and utilize whatever method is most available and offers assurance of speediest success.

No bailout, however deftly structured, offers any “assurance” of success. The situation is too treacherous for that. A bailout is a gamble, but not a stupid or extravagant one (banking crises never come cheap), and the stakes are too high to avoid it. To do little or nothing, or to rely on the free market alone, would be to display reckless optimism of the type that got us into this trouble in the first place.

The free market simply cannot do its job in a climate of rising and highly infectious financial panic, hysteria, and risk aversion. A bailout offers a chance of restoring the confidence needed for its normal operation, and with this the semblance of a normal economic cycle.

The alternative could well be systemic collapse, and it is that, not Hank Paulson, that will pave the way for Leviathan.

'Space Chimps' on a Wild Ride Through Outer Space

Space Chimps

The New York Sun, July 18, 2008

When Alan Shepard returned safely to Earth late in the Gagarin spring of 1961, a relieved, ecstatic nation treated him to ticker tape, meet-the-president, and, subsequently, a trip to the moon. The previous astronaut sent by NASA into space hadn't fared quite so well. Emerging snarling and indignant from an edge-of-disaster suborbital shambles that was a comedy of human error and simian savoir faire, Ham had to make do with an apple, a pat on the head, and a speedy return to the desert laboratory that had, with the help of occasional electric shocks and (one hopes) more frequent banana pellets, trained him so effectively. Ham, I should say, was a chimpanzee, one of only two to escape the surly bonds of Earth — at least until Tim Burton's "Planet of the Apes."

Ham never returned to space. He was held for years in Washington, D.C.'s National Zoo before being allowed to enjoy a glorious polygamous twilight in North Carolina, a twilight that, if "Space Chimps," the latest CGI saga from Vanguard Animation ("Valiant," "Happily N'Ever After") is to be believed, left him with just one grandson, the ne'er-do-well Ham III. Voiced by "Saturday Night Live"'s Andy Samberg, he's a slacker circus chimp, clad in sub-Knievel kitsch and periodically shot from a cannon in a tawdry parody of his famous forebear's legendary feat.

Everything changes when Ham is conscripted by a flailing space agency to be the p.r. face of a mission to retrieve a probe lost on a planet at the wrong end of a wormhole. Shot into space with the "Star-Trek"-citing straight arrow Commander Titan (a Pan troglodytes Buzz Lightyear, voiced by Patrick Warburton, who played Puddy on "Seinfeld") and the coyly fetching Lieutenant Luna (Cheryl Hines), a chimpanzee hottie with more than a passing resemblance to the Zira who fell so hard for Charlton Heston's bright-eyed Taylor, Ham is forced to decide what he's going to make of himself.

In a movie not notable for its originality, it's no surprise that, in the didactic, rapscallion-with-a-heart-of-gold tradition of children's fiction, Ham ultimately discovers his better self. He helps his friends. He rescues the oppressed. He acknowledges his wise old mentor. By the end of the film, the tousled scapegrace has proved himself a worthy heir to his heroic grandfather, "a chimp," Titan says in one of the better of the entertainingly awful ape-themed puns scattered throughout this movie, "off the old block." And, yes, he ends up with considerably more than an apple.

With its chase scenes, laughable, not-too-scary villain, affable apes, lovable aliens, mild subversion of the adult world, hokey sentimentality, endemic cuteness, cheesy sound track, goofily lame jokes, gentle potty humor, and Crayola-colored extraterrestrial settings, there's probably enough in this movie to make it a good dumping ground for the kids on a rainy summer afternoon. The younger ones, at least, should have a reasonably fun time, particularly if stoned on Twizzlers and Coke. This, after all, is the demographic that enriched the Wiggles — sophistication is not the name of their game.

Despite a few, very few, amusing moments clearly designed to appeal to an older audience (on the whole I'd have preferred a few banana pellets), adults are likely to regard sitting through Ham's space odyssey as something of an ordeal. The film lacks the wit, inventiveness, and charm that made "Toy Story," say, or "Shrek" such strong intergenerational hits. That's not to deny that "Space Chimps" is, technically speaking, an accomplished achievement, certainly to anyone, such as me, brought up in the "Top Cat" era, and, I suspect, even for some of those whose early years were more Pixar than Hanna-Barbera.

But technological savvy isn't enough. This is a film that just lacks the spark necessary to keep it from what seems bound to be a lonely afterlife in the dustier corners of Blockbuster's children's section. For a film about outer space, the screenplay is miserably earthbound. Worse still, the talented cast (which also includes Jeff Daniels, Kristin Chenoweth, and Stanley Tucci) is rarely given an opportunity to do much more than simply recite lines that needed a lot more help than that.

Meanwhile, despite occasional moments of hallucinatory splendor, the almost immeasurably remote planet Malgor is routinely depicted as little more than a Pufnstuf New Mexico. Its inhabitants are, for the most part, by-the-numbers oddball creatures, with the possible exception of the creepily sweet Kilowatt (Ms. Chenoweth), a megalocephalic dollhouse Tinker Bell with, perhaps, a touch of the Murakami studio about her.

If there is one time when this movie manages to rise above itself, it's when the chimps' spacecraft first leaves Earth behind it. In a short, magical, beguiling sequence, the filmmakers manage to convey a sense of beauty, immensity, and wonder. It's a glimpse of the movie that might have been, and a hint, frustrating in its brevity, of the original Ham's strange, wild ride.

Holding Up A Shattered Mirror

Funny Games

The New York Sun, March 14, 2008

When it comes to movie do-overs, the recklessly sexy Naomi Watts just cannot keep herself out of trouble. In remakes of "Ringu" ("The Ring") and "King Kong," she found herself stalked by, respectively, a monstrous spirit and a rampaging ape. If, as has been reported, she stars in an upcoming reworking of Alfred Hitchcock's "The Birds," she will soon be facing an enraged avian army. But none of these ordeals, past or future, are enough to deter the much menaced Ms. Watts from appearing in yet another remake — the sinister and distressing "Funny Games," a film in which she confronts the most dangerous creature of all: man.

Naomi, peril, remake — so far, so familiar. But what makes this remake so different is the way that it is the same. The new "Funny Games" is simply the Austrian director Michael Haneke's American version of his own 1997 German-language film. And it's no Mulligan. The original "Funny Games" was profoundly and brilliantly disturbing, an unsettling, upsetting examination of human savagery and the spectacle that we like to make of it. It told the tale of the torment — relentless, remorseless, and just for the fun of it — of a vacationing family at the hands of Peter (Frank Giering) and Paul (Arno Frisch), two preppies with more than a touch of Leopold and Loeb about them. Almost all the physical violence was off-screen, but the intensity of the cruelty on display, and the forensic psychological skill with which it was wielded, made "Funny Games" a tour de force that was almost, but not quite, unbearable to watch. And it's that "not quite" that's the rub.

Yes, Wim Wenders, the distinguished German director, walked out when the movie was shown at Cannes in 1997, but most people who have watched it have seen it through to its brutal conclusion. Some may even have enjoyed it. I didn't, but I was fascinated, intrigued, and gripped, which I think, I hope, is something else. Of course, Mr. Haneke was not the first to ask awkward questions about how we react to media depictions of violence, but the clever and highly manipulative manner in which he did so was not the least of his film's far-from-funny games. Throw in the extraordinary performances by the cast, and it is difficult to deny that the first "Funny Games" was some kind of masterpiece.

So why remake it, and why remake it as a shot-for-shot re-creation of the original? The actors are different, they speak their lines in English, and the action has been transferred from Austria to America. But in almost every other way, the two films are identical. The rationale for the remake lies not only in the obvious lure of a wider audience, but also, more interestingly, in its location. Mr. Haneke clearly relished the idea of using a Hollywood studio (Warner Bros.) to inject his film into the American entertainment culture that, he claims, inspired it, but which it repudiates.

That said, positioning "Funny Games" as a critique of a specifically American cinema may win Mr. Haneke the usual plaudits from the usual suspects, but it risks diluting its impact. To see this as a film solely "about America" (and I don't think that Mr. Haneke truly does) is to divert it from the source of its appalling power as a commentary on humanity as a whole — a perspective that will, ironically, be enhanced for American viewers by virtue of the fact that the story is now presented in their own language. Watching "Funny Games" in subtitled German offered Americans the comforting possibility that it was merely an account of Teutonic beastliness, an all too familiar theme. To shoot it in English removes that alibi. Peter and Paul ensnare their victims. Mr. Haneke entraps his. There is nowhere to turn. This isn't a film about Austrians; it is a film about us, all of us, wherever or whoever we are.

In almost every other respect, there is little to choose between the two versions. If the first was a masterpiece, so is the second. When it comes to the principals, Tim Roth and Naomi Watts (as the tortured couple) do just fine, but never equal the depth of the late Ulrich Mühe (so compelling as the hero of "The Lives of Others") or, even more notably, Susanne Lothar: Her portrayal of the crushed and broken wife is one of the most harrowing performances in modern cinema. On the other hand, as Peter and Paul, Brady Corbet and Michael Pitt manage to eclipse their Germanic predecessors, which is no small achievement.

Floppy-haired, soft-spoken, and Locust Valley immaculate, these are the most well-mannered of sadists — Mengeles filtered through Choate, Berias groomed by Andover. Precisely, methodically, and, on the whole, most politely, they test, they probe, and then they tear apart a family just because, well, they can. Of the two, the diffident, pudgy, clumsy Peter (Mr. Corbet), his odd, off-kilter face punctuated with the lips of a Habsburg princeling, comes across as a stumblebum psychotic — as feeble, ultimately, as he is lethal. While some of his supposed weaknesses are themselves just another game, he is, in reality, little more than foil, stooge, and plaything for the more dominant Paul (Mr. Pitt). It is Paul, we come to discover, who is presiding over these games, both within the movie, and beyond. It is Paul who gives us a glimpse of the abyss.

Or is it, more horrifying still, a look into a mirror?

Sacred monsters

Michael Burleigh: Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism

The New Criterion, October 1, 2008

New York City, September 2001  © Andrew Stuttaford

If you are searching for a few scraps of comfort about the nature of our species, you would do very well to avoid Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism, the latest in a series of profoundly depressing books by the British historian Michael Burleigh. If, on the other hand, your objective is to examine the current global eruption of Islamic extremism through a wider perspective than the usual minaret, mullah, and middle-eastern rancor, Blood & Rage is an essential, imperative read, and well worth crossing the cyber pond to buy (it’s as yet unavailable in the United States).

A decade ago this was probably not a volume Professor Burleigh would have anticipated writing.  In the final sentences of his grim, grand, and uncomfortably perceptive The Third Reich: A New History (2000), even the generally gloomy Burleigh was cheered by the way that the disasters of the twentieth century appeared to have dealt a devastating blow to the millenarian dreaming that had done so much to devastate that era:

The lower register, the more pragmatic ambitions, the talk of taxes, markets, education, health and welfare, evident in the political culture of Europe and North America, constitute progress… . Our lives may be more boring than those who lived in apocalyptic times, but being bored is greatly preferable to being prematurely dead because of some ideological fantasy.

The following year, the twin towers fell.

History, once again, had made a fool of the historian. By 2008 Burleigh could write, apocalyptically enough, of “an existential threat to the whole of civilization.” If the Clinton years had seemed a little “boring” when compared with what had gone before, it was only because we were too distracted, too complacent, and too incurious to notice what beasts were slouching our way.

Burleigh doesn’t want us to repeat that mistake. Blood & Rage is urgent, insistent, and angry, so much so that it occasionally topples over into the clichés of what Brits dub “saloon bar” wisdom (imagine Fox’s Bill O’Reilly pontificating in a Surrey pub). Like much of Burleigh’s work, Blood & Rage is panoramic in its scope (it begins with Fenians and ends with jihadis), and it’s packed with intriguing and awkward historical detail, quite a bit of which is guaranteed to irritate the usual suspects on campus and in the media. The book has been criticized for lacking a clear unifying theme, but there’s not a lot that nationalist killers such as, say, the IRA, ETA, or Black September have in common with the millenarian butchers of al Qaeda or the Russian anarchist fringe—except, most notably, the corpses they leave behind (it says a great deal about Burleigh that he often takes the trouble to record the names of the victims). If there is one broader lesson to be drawn from Blood & Rage, however, it’s this: terrorism may ebb and flow, but it will, like Cain, always be with us.

For a deeper understanding of the specific plague that we pigeonhole as “al Qaeda,” read Blood & Rage in conjunction with Earthly Powers (2005) and Sacred Causes (2006), Burleigh’s remarkable two-volume depiction of the danse macabre of religion, politics, and revolutionary violence that has whirled its way through four centuries of an emerging “modern” era that still has, evidently, plenty of room for the old Adam. Taken together, these three extraordinarily wide-ranging books can be seen, among the many other attributes they share, as a shrewd and unsettling investigation of the persistence, allure, and danger of religious (in a very broad sense of the word) absolutism, a phenomenon that has, in one way or another, been an important element in all too many of mankind’s attempts to establish an organizing principle for its societies.

In earlier epochs, enforcing its imperatives was made (for those who needed it to be made easier) by the belief that to do so was God’s will. Thus killing the heretic was worship, not murder, a tough, noble deed that brought heaven just a touch closer. But in Earthly Powers and Sacred Causes Burleigh reminds us that you don’t need God for an Inquisition or, for that matter, a religion. Oddly, Sacred Causes is subtitled “The Clash of Religion and Politics, from the Great War to the War on Terror.” Clash? It’s true that the years after 1918 were marked by an onslaught on the established churches by Europe’s new totalitarian states, but the nature of that attack was itself, in many respects, “religious.” This wasn’t a clash between religion and politics so much as an attempt to merge the two forcibly. Belief in God was sometimes a casualty, rationality always. “The people dream,” wrote Konrad Heiden (Hitler’s first biographer), “and a soothsayer tells them what they are dreaming.” As Burleigh explains, these totalitarian regimes “metabolized the religious instinct.” Both state and state-sponsored cult became, he argues, “objects of religious devotion,” their ideologies “political religions” of a type already visible in the revolutionary France that is in some ways the principal villain of Earthly Powers.

This is, I suppose, a perverse tribute to the persistence of man’s innate religious instinct, something to which Burleigh attaches an importance at odds with the usual orthodoxies. Of course, it’s not particularly novel to regard Nazism as a cult (although in The Third Reich, Burleigh extends this analysis further than most), but it’s somewhat rarer to see a similar diagnosis applied so comprehensively to Bolshevism (the Asian variants of Communism are, unfortunately, outside the scope of these books, although I can guess what Burleigh, a writer who is as humane as he is caustic, would have made of Maoism) and, more provocatively still, to the very roots of supposedly “scientific” socialism itself.

But if God died, He took His time doing so. We have grown accustomed to the idea that religion in Europe spent the post- Enlightenment centuries rapidly retreating to the private sphere, and thence to quietist oblivion. This process may have been uneven, but it was, so runs the argument, as continuous and as inevitable as the defeat of those throne-and-altar types who tried to impede it. Burleigh reveals this narrative to be as inaccurate as it is incomplete. He resurrects philosophers, politicians, and movements largely written out of more conventional accounts of the past. To be sure, some of those exhumed are so marginal and so mad that they might have been better left to molder on undisturbed, but the cumulative effect is fascinating, a rich rococo mess, rather than the dully one-directional tramline that defines the progressive view of history.

If the religious instinct survived (as it was always bound to—we are what we are), the weakening of long-established vehicles for its expression left it vulnerable to the new political religions and with them the delusion that it was possible for man to build heaven here on earth, a fantasy that paved the way for attempts to create a state of limitless reach and unbridled cruelty. That’s not to claim (and Burleigh wouldn’t) that the totalitarian impulse is now solely the preserve of the unbeliever. In an age defaced by the Taliban and al Qaeda, who could? Besides, attempting to pin the blame on either godliness or godlessness is less useful than looking at the very nature of belief itself—and how it can, and frequently does, mutate so horrifically, and how, for that matter, it can be manipulated.  After reading Burleigh’s books and contemplating their rogue’s gallery of madmen, prophets, and monsters, it’s difficult to avoid the conclusion (even if it’s never directly spelled out) that the origins of jihadi violence lie as much in the darker recesses of the human psyche as in the peculiarities of any one religion or, indeed, region. As Burleigh demonstrates, a Bernard Lewis may be an invaluable guide to the appeal of bin Ladenism, but so is Fyodor Dostoevsky.

In his ideas, in the breadth of his writings, and in the distinct, acerbic, and sometimes bleakly humorous spirit that permeates them, there’s a hint of Edward Gibbon about Burleigh. If we listen to what he has to say (including some useful practical suggestions at the end of Blood & Rage), we may have a better chance of avoiding our very own decline and fall. The last one was bad enough

Fight for Your Right To Fight

Battle in Seattle

The New York Sun, September 19, 2008

One doesn't have to agree politically with a movie to appreciate the skill with which it was made or, for that matter, to enjoy it. To combine a bad film, however, with worse politics is to add insult to injury, which brings us to the topic of "Battle in Seattle," a ham-fisted, sanctimonious blend of leftist agitprop, by-the-numbers melodrama, and excruciating self-righteousness that arrives in theaters Friday. If you are currently taking orders from Rage Against the Machine, Michael Moore, or Naomi Klein, go and see it; for anyone else, this is one "Battle" you're going to lose.

The movie begins with a brief but remarkably paranoid introductory history sequence, a sort of Protocols of the Elders of GATT, designed to expose the supposedly sinister evolution of the postwar international trade regime. Having set this bleak, menacing, and thoroughly conspiratorial scene, "Battle in Seattle" then gets down to business — or, more accurately, to stopping business. The film is a fictionalized account of the 1999 anti-globalization protests that trashed Seattle, wrecked the World Trade Organization negotiations, and left a legacy that has bedeviled the WTO ever since.

Its writer-director, Stuart Townsend, tells the tale through the stories of a handful of protagonists, primarily some noble protesters. But he reinforces it with a noble Médecins Sans Frontières-type physician (Rade Serbedzija), a noble representative of the Third World (Isaach de Bankolé), an eventually noble TV journalist who comes to see the error of her corporate media ways (Connie Nielsen, a long, long way from "Gladiator"), and a potentially noble, basically good-hearted cop (Woody Harrelson) who, prompted in part by what befalls his wife (the ever-decorative Charlize Theron), finishes the movie at least dimly aware that he is being duped by the Man.

The case for free trade is, of course, never made. The benefits it has brought the developing world don't rate a mention. All we hear about is exploitation. "Battle in Seattle" is a modern morality play, and like most morality plays, it's drawn with little nuance and less character development. As Mayor Tobin (presumably a rendering of real-life Seattle mayor Paul Schell), Ray Liotta turns in a cleverly convincing portrait of a soixante-huitard bewildered by a radicalism he once would have understood. But Mr. Liotta's sensitive, well-judged performance is the exception. His character is a believable, conflicted human being, a refreshing presence in a drama peopled, if that's the word, by cardboard cutouts.

The protesters at the center of "Battle in Seattle" never emerge from the didactic stereotypes within which they are confined. Beautiful Sam (Jennifer Carpenter) is the sensitive, smart one; Django (OutKast's Andre Benjamin) is the genial joker, and Lou (Michelle Rodriguez) is fiery, feisty, and, let's face it, a bit of a pain. Needless to say, they are all passionate, sincere, idealistic, and selfless, none more so than their leader, the charismatic Jay (Martin Henderson), who is determined, inspiring, and replete with tragic backstory and Jesus hair-and-beard. The only surprise is that when he is restored to his people after a time of tribulation, it is not on the third day.

That's not to say that "Battle in Seattle" doesn't have its moments: The scenes outside the prison where some protestors have been detained are powerful; with the help of a surging melody, they even stirred my own dark, reactionary soul. What's more, the film occasionally — very occasionally — has something useful to say. The two acts of brutality that come to define Mr. Townsend's portrayal of the police response to the protests may dissolve into a bloody sludge of karma and caricature, but the director's depiction of a police department unprepared for what hits the city rings true. So does the obvious implication that the resulting confusion inflamed a situation that may not (as is sometimes claimed) have been a "police riot," but was certainly chaotic and, at times, all too heavy-handed.

To be fair, Mr. Townsend doesn't dodge the fact that the protesters were themselves responsible for much of the violence that marked the Seattle protests, although he is careful to pin the blame on an anarchist minority. There's some truth to that latter claim, but only some, and it sidesteps the awkward question of whether large crowds swarming downtown Seattle with the intention of stopping people from going to a conference they wish to attend can, in any meaningful sense, be considered "nonviolent." At the very least, such "direct action" (to use the usual euphemism) is intimidation, if not mob rule — something that Mr. Townsend veers dangerously close to endorsing in a closing sequence that seems to celebrate the trouble that has surrounded subsequent WTO gatherings.

Judging by his movie's script, Mr. Townsend's justification for this appears to be that the WTO lacks democratic legitimacy, an argument with emotional, if not always logical, appeal in an era when globalization has left many feeling as though they've lost control of their economic destiny. It might have more force, however, if moviegoers could believe that Sam, Lou, Django, Jay, and their ilk would have protested just as vigorously against, say, the no less undemocratic Kyoto treaty. Fat chance. Their real beef, of course, is with nasty old capitalism (the ugliest expletive throughout "Battle in Seattle" is "corporate"), a dreary, shop-soiled grudge to which this film adds little beyond a city's smashed shop windows.

The Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful

The Duchess

The New York Sun, September 19, 2008

Barely more than a decade after that tragic dash through Paris and the unhinged, hysterical carnival of lamentation that followed, it is no great surprise that Princess Diana continues to cast a shadow over popular culture, particularly in the country where she once seemed destined to be queen. It is, nonetheless, disappointing to detect that elements of her tawdry, strip-mined melodrama have been slipped into Saul Dibb's new film "The Duchess," which arrives in theaters Friday. The British director gives what should have been a perfectly respectable biopic of Georgiana, an 18th-century Duchess of Devonshire, contemporary resonance it neither needs nor deserves.

Yes, Diana was the duchess's great-great-great-great-niece and, yes, both women weathered marriages that were indeed (to borrow a word) "crowded," but neither genealogy nor (very) superficially similar matrimonial difficulties are good reasons to blend their (very) different stories. The lure of the box office is, I suppose, to blame. Diana still sells.

Very loosely based on Amanda Foreman's clever, immaculately researched, and enthralling biography of Georgiana, Mr. Dibb's movie has taken the story of one of the most fascinating Englishwomen of her epoch — a celebrated socialite and political campaigner — and transformed it into a big-budget blend of Lifetime television, Masterpiece Theatre, and Diana Spencer tribute movie. Thus, the young duchess (Keira Knightley) speaks in the soft Sloane tones more typically associated with Lady Di in her early years than with the Georgian grandee she is meant to be playing. Meanwhile, Ralph Fiennes, in a subtle, show-stealing portrayal of the duchess's cold, buttoned-up, and older husband, manages to punctuate his performance with very specific hints of Prince Charles's lugubrious tics, mannerisms, and phraseology — hints that will make a British audience, at least, shudder or snigger, depending on mood.

For the most part, however, this film's sins are of omission. Georgiana may have been a famed fashion icon, but she was also a genuinely effective power broker, a fiercely intelligent woman known as much for her Whiggery as for her truly remarkable wigs, an angle the filmmakers have downplayed in favor of crowd-pleasing emotional drama and roller-coaster marital crises. It's typical that the movie ends on a note of gently accommodating family reconciliation, concluding its narrative at a point that may make some sort of soap-operatic sense, but is well before Georgiana's final period of political prominence. To be fair, at various times we do see the duchess electioneering, and at others she's shown hanging out with Charles James Fox (a potato-faced Simon McBurney, sufficiently wily, sufficiently charming, insufficiently louche) and the rest of his clique, but, taken as a whole, the film leaves the clear impression that the duchess's political role was primarily ornamental. In reality, it was substantially more than that, no small achievement more than a century before female suffrage.

Rather more flatteringly for the duchess, we are not told, except through the most oblique of references, the extent to which her love of gambling (one of the main aristocratic pastimes of that period) became an addiction, bringing in its wake losses that might have brought a blush to the Lehman Brothers's mortgage bond team and which, in part, explained why the poor duke might sometimes have looked a little pained. The reason for this particular omission is probably the filmmakers' wish to present cinemagoers with a suitably sympathetic romantic heroine (so far as they reasonably could, given the tricky historical record). To show her losing tens of thousands at the faro table wouldn't really have done the trick.

Similarly, the duchess's love life (something she pursued with a splendidly 18th-century gusto) is mainly reduced to misery at the hands of her unfeeling husband (that was true enough, alas), a series of harmless flirtations, a not-quite seduction by the woman who goes on to become the duke's live-in mistress, and then one great romance with a future prime minister, Charles Grey (Dominic Cooper, doing his unconvincing best to channel the BBC's Mr. Darcy). The truth was considerably busier, rather more complicated, and much more interesting.

If Georgiana's biography has been prettied up, so has the country in which she lived. Eighteenth-century England was a grubby, smelly, uncomfortable place. Even its grandest houses were just a pace or two from squalor and were, for the most part, none too clean themselves. The same could be said of their inhabitants, not to mention those unfortunate enough to live beyond ducal walls. The beautifully filmed England of "The Duchess" (courtesy of cinematographer Gyula Pados) is, by contrast, immaculate, a land of lush landscapes, Augustan charm, and gorgeous Palladian magnificence. It bears about as much resemblance to the real thing as Marie Antoinette (a friend of Georgiana's, not that you'd know it from this movie) did to the simple shepherdesses she occasionally pretended to be.

No matter. As a backdrop to what is, in essence, a well-crafted, well-acted, period romance, this prettily stage-set, sceptr'd isle will do just fine. We'll leave the slums, the stench, and, for that matter, the disease that was later to wreck the lovely Georgiana's looks to some other, more realistic film.

But if you allow yourself to overlook the historical inaccuracy, the faint feminist subtext, and the forced, tiresome parallels with the Windsors' domestic disasters, "The Duchess" can be fun. So why not take a break from Wall Street worries and wallow instead in an hour or two of spectacle, splendor, and sentimentality?

Aided by landscape, architecture, and costume, "The Duchess" looks terrific and the script does its best, too, helped along by a cast stronger than this film probably deserves. Mr. Fiennes may steal the show, but as Lady Spencer (Georgiana's mother), a matriarch who combines strong maternal affection with a steely sense of dynastic obligation, the perennially formidable Charlotte Rampling dominates every scene in which she appears. By comparison, Ms. Knightley was bound to struggle, but with her strangely old-fashioned beauty, she at least looks the part, and the pathos she successfully brings to her performance reinforces the aura of victimhood without which no romantic heroine is complete. In such a shamefully enjoyable film, what more could one ask?

Dragging Kennedy Into a New Fight

Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived

The New York Sun, September 16, 2008

At its best, counterfactual or "virtual" history (to use Harvard historian Niall Ferguson's term), the exploration of what might have happened if history had not taken a certain turn, can be a fascinating intellectual exercise, a "what if" that illuminates what did happen. Unfortunately, "Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived," which begins a two-week run at Film Forum tomorrow, is neither fascinating nor illuminating.

Helmed by first-time director Koji Masutani, and featuring Brown University professor James Blight (previously known for his work on "The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons From the Life of Robert S. McNamara"), this new documentary is, at least superficially, devoted to the question of whether President Kennedy would have extricated America from the Vietnam conflict long before it could spiral into the quagmire that, under his successor, it became.

Despite the best efforts of Oliver Stone, that's an old debate that can never be resolved. This film adds little to it other than artfully selected news footage, some interesting audio recordings of discussions within the Kennedy administration, and an inordinate amount of wishful thinking. The filmmakers examine the foreign policy crises that defined Kennedy's term, and use the way he handled them to conclude that he was a president who did everything he could to avoid all-out war, whether of the nuclear variety (over the construction of the Berlin Wall or the installation of Russian missiles in Cuba) or something less apocalyptic (the decision to abandon the anti-Castro forces at the Bay of Pigs, and an early reluctance to commit significant ground forces in Indochina).

Add to this some comments contemplating withdrawal from Vietnam that Kennedy made not long before his assassination, and a case begins to come into focus. But begin is all it does. Most of the rest of the film is devoted to images of an embattled President Johnson and brief glimpses of the Vietnam war itself: nothing new, in other words. The movie's point, it's claimed, is the hardly novel idea that it really does matter who is president. President Kennedy might well have called a halt in Vietnam; President Johnson didn't.

But that's not really what "Virtual JFK" is about. The movie's real target finally emerges emerges in its closing moments when the following quotation appears on-screen: "Every time history repeats itself, the price of the lesson goes up." Ah, so that's it. This film is not about Vietnam — not really. It's about Iraq, and Kennedy's role in it is to act as El Cid, a "virtual JFK" in a very different sense, sent forth to do battle with those wicked Republicans one more time. Thus we see Kennedy in press conference after press conference, his deftness, charm, and eloquence a devastating rebuke both to the sourpuss, crudely belligerent, Grand Old Party he occasionally finds time to tease and also, by implication, to the current occupant of the White House — tongue-tied, bellicose and, as president, responsible for a war that need not have been.

If you think some of that sounds like caricature as much as history (actual or virtual), you're right.

Imitation Jules

The New York Sun, July 11, 2008

On March 9, 1886, poor, deranged Gaston Verne shot his uncle Jules, the French writer often credited with the invention of science fiction. The great man survived, but if he'd known what filmmakers would do with his books in the centuries to follow, he probably would have reached for that revolver himself.

The latest movie to spring from Verne's pages, "Journey to the Center of the Earth," may turn out far better than what has come before, but the precedents are not encouraging. Previous "Journeys" — no fewer than five television projects and four feature films have worn the name — have been more trudge than adventure, despite attempts to boost the novel's sometimes leaden pace with additional love interests, murderous rivalries, a martyred duck, a massive ape, humanoid dinosaurs, sexy primeval girls, noble Maori rebels, gunrunning, and, in a confusing 1989 version that doubled as a sequel to "Alien From L.A.," Kathy Ireland.

The idea that Verne's fanciful stories are, by themselves, no longer enough to draw a crowd can be detected in many of the films that have been made of his work. The two best-known versions of Verne's 1874 novel, "The Mysterious Island," added giant animals into the mix, and one of them also threw in a giant bomb just to make sure. Disney's simpering, sickly "In Search of the Castaways" (1962) hit the rocks when an aging Maurice Chevalier broke into saccharine song.

On the other hand, if we avert our eyes from the grotesque blend of martial arts, slapstick, and ham that was Hollywood's most recent take on "Around the World in 80 Days" (with Jackie Chan as Passepartout), Phileas Fogg's legendary circumnavigation has been treated relatively kindly, notably in its 1956 retelling starring David Niven. Notwithstanding a balloon transplanted from an earlier Verne novel, this effort stuck fairly closely to the original story line and offered its audience a spectacle that the old Frenchman, a man fully in touch with his inner Barnum, would have relished.

Verne would also have been intrigued by the way "Around the World" was enriched by the nostalgia with which it is saturated. Just 11 years after Hiroshima, it depicted the mid-Victorian world as a gentle, almost prelapsarian place, its disorders more antic than dangerous, its inventions amusingly retro contraptions. Similarly, and ironically, Fogg's hectic dash had been transformed by time and technology into a symbol of a leisured era, into something that now seems almost stately. Understanding the implications of these changes in perception helps explain those added dinosaurs, karate kicks, and Maoris: Many of the wonders chronicled by Verne are, nowadays, anything but. Making the filmmakers' task more difficult still, the characters created by this most Joe Friday of novelists are, more often than not, cutouts, sketches, and caricatures. The most worthwhile exception is, of course, Captain Nemo, that enigmatic specter of alienation, vengeance, and the utopian violence of the century to come. The captain has benefited from compelling performances by some of cinema's finest, including James Mason (the most convincing Nemo of all), Michael Caine, Herbert Lom, and, appropriately, another captain, the Starship Enterprise's Picard (Patrick Stewart).

But if Nemo has fared well at the movies, the same cannot be said of his lonely odyssey. Neither Mr. Lom nor Mr. Stewart managed to extricate his respective "Mysterious Island" film (the former in 1961, the latter in 2005) from the wreckage of its screenplay, while even the best "20,000 Leagues Under the Sea" project (the Walt Disney version from 1954, with Mason) modified, sweetened, and dumbed down Verne's original in a way that sapped much of its power. That said, it is one of its rivals — the Michael Caine film, one of two made-for-TV versions of this story produced in 1997 — that may indicate the best way forward for renderings of Verne. The narrative, bloated by a bitter father-son rivalry, a romance with the girlfriend from "Ferris Bueller" (Nemo's daughter, remarkably), and, yes, the resettling of Atlantis, is the usual Verne movie shambles. But the film's evocative, almost steampunk aesthetic — an exhilarating blend of brass, iron, pumps, and valves, of William Morris, satanic mills, and a science that never quite emerged — is not.

Verne's future may, in one sense, be behind us, but as an alternative reality, or as an imagined universe of (to borrow William Golding's lovely phrase) "astronauts by gaslight," it still has the potential to enchant. There are glimpses of how this could be in Captain Nemo's appearance in Alan Moore's graphic novel "The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen," but Verne's stories themselves still await such treatment.

The Man Who Would Be Kingpin

Wanted

The New York Sun, June 27, 2008

Whatever else you might want to say about it, Mark Millar's graphic novel "Wanted" was one of the most effective evocations of nerd-boy rage since the days of Bobby Fischer. Obscene, misogynistic, scatological, and saturated with a nasty geek nihilism, it's a clever, unsettling, and unpleasant bloodbath only occasionally softened by signs that it was intended as some sort of parody. Reports that "Wanted" was to be turned into a major Hollywood vehicle made for a bad day. The news that it was going to be filmed by Timur Bekmambetov made a bad day worse.

Mr. Bekmambetov is a Russian director best known in the West for "Night Watch" and "Day Watch," huge hits in his home country that were, if nothing else, reassuring evidence that the era of the Soviet collective-farm epic has, mercifully, drawn to a close. Indeed, the Russian appetite for flashy, empty-headed movies with pretensions of saga status is, these days, just as great as our own. The first installments in a confused and barely comprehensible fantasy trilogy, "Night Watch" and "Day Watch" have been compared by the deluded or the hired with the "Lord of the Rings" films, a comparison not unlike claiming that "Van Helsing" should be ranked with "Dracula." The prospect of Mr. Bekmambetov taking his restless, gimmicky, and derivative camera into the depths of Mr. Millar's perverse multiverse was almost too awful to contemplate.

Remarkably, however, the director and his scriptwriters (previously best known for their contributions to "The Fast and the Furious" canon) have surmounted both their limitations and the business problem presented by Mr. Millar's original material by coming up with a plot that is not only pretty much their own, but, once one has accepted its fundamental absurdity, fairly easy to follow. The starting point in "Wanted" owes much to Mr. Millar and his concept of a geeky loser trapped in Dilbertland who comes to discover that he is the heir to something powerful, dangerous, and strange (wish fulfillment, anybody?).

From there, however, the film mainly goes its own way (apart from the watered-down finale), with only the occasional allusion to the original "Wanted." Mr. Millar's key dystopian premise has been shelved, and with it, his supremely unattractive super-villains (including a Thing-like creature composed of serial-killer fecal matter), the use of random killings and rape as methods of empowerment, and rather too many sequences of peculiarly grotesque violence.

Instead, moviegoers will be treated to a mildly enjoyable piece of hyperkinetic hokum. Innovative it is not. "Wanted" is overreliant on car chases as dully prolonged as a mid-'70s guitar solo and about as original, age-old conspiracies with more than a hint of Dan Brown about them, and slow-motion bullet ballets of a type already clichéd by the end of the first "Matrix" film. If "Wanted" feels by-the-numbers, that's because it is: Even its mayhem comes across as just a touch too planned. Crash the car. Wreck the train. Kill someone.

The movie has its moments, one or two good jokes, and a satisfactory number of exploding heads, but, whatever its director's aspirations, it fails to convey that sense of another world — ours but not quite — that ought to be key to any comic book adaptation. A film of this type should be a magic carpet ride, exhilarating and impossible. "Wanted," by contrast, is as functional as a trip on the crosstown bus, complete with stops, starts, and periods of boredom.

When given the chance, the cast does the best it can. Mr. McAvoy is splendid as Wesley, the bright, put-upon office drone who discovers that he is a member of an ancient caste of assassins. Slight and not particularly tall, Mr. McAvoy is not an obvious action hero, but as Wesley is taught the ways of the Weavers (the ancient caste, not the ancient folk group) in a series of tutorials that appear mainly to involve repeated beatings, target shooting at corpses, and riding the roofs of Chicago's 'L' trains, the actor offers a surprisingly convincing picture of a nerd being transformed into possibly the planet's most lethal killer — no small achievement for a man who played a faun in the first Narnia movie.

Meanwhile, as Weaver chief Sloan, Morgan Freeman takes a break from playing the president and God to remind us that he can portray someone altogether less lofty. Clad in what looks like early Reagan-era Men's Wearhouse, he's bureaucrat, capo, and mentor — a blend of organization man, Don Corleone, and the X-Men's Professor Xavier. He's also an individual with secrets to hide, something that Mr. Freeman manages to convey with little more than a deft glance. Under the circumstances, it's an amazingly subtle performance.

And then there's Angelina Jolie as Fox, the Weaver who is the first to wrench Wesley away from his previously humdrum life before becoming his trainer and, on his first mission, accomplice. Fierce, chiseled, and commanding, Ms. Jolie dominates nearly every scene in which she appears. As is to be expected of the former Mrs. Smith, she makes a very believable assassin. Nevertheless, it's difficult to shake the feeling that her role is as much "Angelina Jolie" as it is Fox, as much a riff on her own public image as an interpretation of the character she is allegedly depicting. Either way, it's a hypnotic performance, if it is a performance: There's an alarmingly feral glint in her eye that must, I imagine, be very, very tricky to fake. There are times when I tremble for Brad Pitt.